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A FAILURE OF SUBSTANCE AND A FAILURE OF
PROCESS: THE CIRCULAR ODYSSEY OF
OKLAHOMA’S CORPORATE LAW AMENDMENTS
IN 2010, 2012, AND 2013
STEVEN J. CLEVELAND *
When we passed [the bill in 2010], . . . Chesapeake came in
here and told us we had to do this in order to protect
Oklahoma corporations from the likes of Carl Icahn. 1
And then [in 2012] we bailed ONEOK and OGE out . . .
because, in bailing out Aubrey [McClendon and Chesapeake
in 2010], we caught up a couple of good corporations who’ve
been doing what they were supposed to be doing. 2
And so now that [it’s 2013 and Chesapeake] is governed in a
different manner, it looks like we’re undoing the sweetheart
deal [of 2010]. That probably doesn’t give a very good
perception to the public. 3

* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. J.D., 1998, Georgetown
University; B.A., 1990, University of California at Los Angeles. Thanks to the attorneys,
legislators, and lobbyists who offered insight regarding the legislative processes described
herein. All errors are my own.
1. Bill Information for HB 1646: Video, OKLA. ST. LEGISLATURE (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=HB1646&Session=1300 (follow “Video”;
then follow “HB 1646” hyperlink) [hereinafter 2013 House Debate] (quoting Rep. Cory
Williams (D-Stillwater) at 23:50).
2. Id. (quoting Rep. Williams at 58:57).
3. Id. (quoting Rep. Mike Reynolds (R-Oklahoma City) at 22:48).
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We may suspect that legislators sway legislative outcomes to favor
those who wield power, 4 but rarely do legislators expressly admit to
enacting special-interest legislation that favors an individual or a
corporation. Oklahoma legislators, however, candidly admitted to
enacting legislation in 2010 to protect Aubrey McClendon—the colorful
co-owner of an NBA franchise, the Oklahoma City Thunder—and the
corporation that he co-founded—Chesapeake Energy Corporation
(Chesapeake)—from famed corporate raider Carl Icahn. 5
When enacting that special-interest legislation to protect McClendon
and Chesapeake, Oklahoma legislators overshot their mark, prompting
them, in 2012, to enact additional special-interest legislation. 6 ONEOK,
Inc. (ONEOK) and OGE Energy Corp. (OGE), two of Oklahoma’s
largest employers, requested that 2012 change, which exempted them
from the earlier enactment. 7
While legislators intended the 2010 enactment to protect Chesapeake
from significant change at the managerial level, the market reacted
negatively to decisions and failures by Chesapeake’s management that
came to light in the spring of 2012—shortly before Chesapeake was to
hold its annual shareholders meeting. Despite the 2010 enactment, and
due to pressures from the market, including those from Carl Icahn,
significant turnover occurred at the board and executive levels of
Chesapeake. 8 Chesapeake’s newly installed managers disfavored the
“protections” provided by the 2010 enactment and alerted the market—
indirectly threatening Oklahoma legislators—of their willingness to
reincorporate to Delaware if the 2010 enactment was not repealed. 9
Consequently, in 2013, the Oklahoma Legislature amended the same
provision of the state’s corporate code for the third time in four years,

4. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 328–31 (3d ed. 2002)
(discussing public purpose requirements, rules against special legislation, and rules requiring
uniformity); id. at 328 (referencing “various forms of rent-seeking by private groups at the
public’s expense”); see also Sen. Tom Udall, Amend the Constitution to Restore Public
Trust in the Political System: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Campaign Finance Reform, 29
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 240–41 (2010) (discussing “legislative capture”).
5. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part II.A-B.
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See, e.g., Appendix A.
9. See infra Part III.A.7.
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effectively repealing the 2010 and 2012 acts. 10
odyssey had come full circle. 11

[Vol. 67:221
The legislature’s

***
Following a brief description of the corporate law that Oklahoma’s
recent enactments affected, Part I addresses the 2010 enactment (2010
Amendment) intended to protect McClendon and Chesapeake. Part II
addresses the 2012 enactment (2012 Amendment) intended to provide
relief to ONEOK and OGE from the 2010 Amendment. Part III
addresses the 2013 enactment (2013 Amendment) that effectively
repealed the 2010 and 2012 Amendments. This article offers criticism
of those amendments, including their substance and the processes by
which the legislature adopted them. Moreover, because Oklahoma’s
corporate law was modeled after that of Delaware, which is the leading
provider of corporate law, 12 this article will also contrast the substance
of, and process behind, the Amendments with that of Delaware’s law.
Each of the 2010, 2012, and 2013 Amendments dealt with a single
provision of Oklahoma’s corporate code. 13 Under the internal affairs
doctrine, Oklahoma regulates matters internal to the operations of
corporations that are incorporated in Oklahoma. 14 Because each of
Chesapeake, ONEOK, and OGE is incorporated in Oklahoma,

10. See infra Part III.B.
11. Though this article focuses on events that occurred in Oklahoma, the import of the
article extends beyond its borders, and is reflective of events that have occurred in many
states. State legislatures commonly act to protect corporations operating with their borders
from acquisition—whether it is Arizona acting to protect Greyhound; Connecticut acting to
protect Aetna; Missouri acting to protect TWA; Pennsylvania acting to protect Hershey’s; or
Washington acting to protect Boeing. See DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS 615-16 (3d ed. 2005); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover
Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 136-38 (1987); Michael J. de la Merced & Andrew Ross
Sorkin, Some Rivals Weigh Bids for Cadbury, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2009, at B1. Fearing the
impact of an acquisition on the local economy, state legislators enact legislation in hopes of
impeding unwanted acquisitions. See Romano, supra, at 136-38.
12. See Steven J. Cleveland, Process Innovation in the Production of Corporate Law,
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1829, 1832 (2008); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy
Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 passim (2006).
13. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1027 (Supp. 2013).
14. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89-91 (1987) (discussing
internal affairs doctrine, and noting “[i]t thus is an accepted part of the business landscape in
this country for States to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the
rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares”).
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Oklahoma may regulate their internal affairs, such as their corporate
governance structures. 15
Corporate shareholders generally centralize the management of their
business in the hands of directors, who typically possess greater
expertise and are better able to oversee business operations. 16 Directors
remain accountable to shareholders, who periodically elect them. Most
jurisdictions, including Oklahoma prior to the 2010 Amendment,
generally provide that the shareholders elect directors to one-year
terms. 17 In most jurisdictions, including Oklahoma prior to 2010
Amendment, the one-year term for a board member is a statutory
default, from which the board and shareholders are empowered to
deviate by, for example, opting for a staggered board. 18 Instead of a
single class of directors, all of whom serve one-year terms, a staggered
board classifies directors into more than one class, with each director
serving a multi-year term. 19 Corporations that choose to stagger their
boards most commonly classify their boards into three classes, with
board members in each of the three classes serving three-year terms and
with only one class of directors coming up for election each year. 20
15. See id. As a corollary, Oklahoma cannot regulate the internal affairs of corporations
that are incorporated in other states, even though such corporations may operate or be
headquartered in Oklahoma. See id.; VantagePoint Venture Partners v. Examen, Inc., 871
A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005). Consequently, Oklahoma’s corporate code is inapplicable to many
corporations that operate in Oklahoma, but are organized under the laws of another state,
such as Devon and the Williams Companies, each of which is organized under the laws of
Delaware. See Devon Energy Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Nov. 6, 2013)
(reflecting incorporation in Delaware); The Williams Cos., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10Q) (Oct. 31, 2013) (same).
16. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors . . . .”); 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1027(a) (2011) (virtually same); see also
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2007) (virtually same).
17. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.05(b) (“The terms of all . . . directors expire at the
next . . . annual shareholders’ meeting following their election . . . .”); see also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c) (“If there be a failure to hold the annual meeting [of shareholders] . . . ,
the Court of Chancery may summarily order a meeting to be held upon the application of
any stockholder or director.”); 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1056(c) (virtually same).
18. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d); 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1027(d) (Supp. 2013);
see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.06.
19. See, e.g., 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1027(d).
20. Id. Delaware, Oklahoma, and the rules of the NYSE cap the number of classes at
three. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (“The directors . . . may . . . be divided into 1, 2 or
3 classes . . . .”); 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1027(d); NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL Rule 304,
available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/sections/ (follow “Section 3” hyperlink) (“The
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Perspectives on staggered boards differ. On the one hand, a one-year term
for board members may enhance accountability to shareholders, as
dissatisfied shareholders may elect an entirely new board at a single
meeting. 21 On the other hand, a staggered board may increase managerial
stability and encourage the board to plan and implement long-term strategy. 22
I. The 2010 Amendment
A. Events Leading to the 2010 Amendment
In the years leading to the 2010 Amendment, investors and
commentators questioned Chesapeake’s managerial decisions. After
climbing dramatically for a decade, the company’s stock price declined
precipitously in 2008. 23
Chesapeake’s Stock Price 24
August, 1995 – August, 2013

Exchange will refuse to authorize listing where the Board of Directors is divided into more
than three classes. Where classes are provided, . . . directors’ terms of office should not
exceed three years.”).
21. See supra note 17.
22. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered
Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 897-98 (2002). In this light,
staggered boards may be viewed as akin to the U.S. government, where the electorate is
unable to displace all of the members of Congress in one fell swoop; instead the terms of the
senators and representatives are multi-year and staggered, so that some experienced
politicians are not up for election each year. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3.
23. Chesapeake Energy Corporation, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com
(search “Quote Lookup” for “CHK”; then follow “Historic Prices” hyperlink; then enter
“Jan. 01, 1998” for “Start Date”; then enter “Jan 01, 2009” for “End Date”; then select
“Weekly” for “Set Date Range”; then select “Get Prices”).
24. Chesapeake Energy Corporation, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/
echarts?s=CHK+Basic+Chart&t=1d (follow “Custom” tab; then enter “08-01-1995” for
“Start Date”; then enter “08-31-2013” for “End Date”).
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In particular, several board decisions invited skepticism. First, the
compensation committee of Chesapeake’s board, which generally should
pursue a compensation scheme that aligns the interests of the chief
executive officer (CEO) with those of the shareholders, generously
compensated the CEO. 25 Despite Chesapeake’s falling stock price in
2008, and despite the company’s performance trailing that of its peers, 26
Chesapeake’s CEO received compensation worth over $112 million for
the year, 27 which was the sixth highest compensation received by
anyone working for a reporting company that year. 28 Second, as its
stock price plummeted in 2008, Chesapeake’s board agreed to purchase
from its CEO a number of antique maps for $12 million. 29 The board’s

25. Compare Chesapeake Energy Corporation Proxy Alert, ISS PROXY ADVISORY
SERVS. 2 (May 18, 2011) [hereinafter Chesapeake Energy Corporation Proxy Report] (“The
board’s repeated failure to link CEO pay to pre-established performance criteria . . .
indicates poor stewardship by the Compensation Committee of the company’s pay
practices.”), with Chesapeake Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 4 (Apr. 19,
2013) (“As a part of our commitment to exceptional governance practices, we want to ensure
that the Company’s executive compensation programs appropriately tie executive pay to
Company performance.”). See generally Doreen E. Lilienfeld & Veronica M. Wissel,
Executive Compensation Planning for Pre-IPO Companies, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 157, 157
(Jan. 23, 2012) (“Shareholder advisory groups and institutional shareholders have also
become more active in policing executive compensation policies and voting against . . .
directors . . . that do not measure up to their standards.”).
26. See Chesapeake Energy Corporation Proxy Report, supra note 25, at 2 (noting
Chesapeake’s “pay-for-performance disconnect” in “a time of sustained relative TSR [total
shareholder return] underperformance”).
27. Joshua Schneyer et al., Special Report: Inside Chesapeake, CEO Ran $200 Million
Hedge Fund, REUTERS (May 2, 2012, 6:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/02/
us-chesapeake-mcclendon-hedge-idUSBRE8410GG20120502 (discussing McClendon’s “total
compensation package worth $112 million . . . includ[ing] a one-time cash bonus of $75
million to help him meet requirements for paying the costs of his personal stakes in
Chesapeake-owned wells”). The Founder’s Well Participation Program is discussed infra Part
III.A.6.
28. David Goldman, The Top 10 Highest Paid CEOs Are...: Ten CEOs Take Home
More Than $70 Million in 2008, with Blackstone’s Stephen Schwarzman Topping the List
with More Than $700 Million in Compensation, CNN MONEY (Aug. 14, 2009, 10:06 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2009/08/14/news/companies/highest_paid_ceos/.
29. Following a lawsuit by shareholders, Chesapeake rescinded the purchase. Russell
Gold, Chesapeake Tweaks Big Payday, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2011, at B1 (“As part of a legal
settlement, Mr. McClendon agreed to buy back, with 2.28% interest, a collection of more
than 500 antique maps . . . [that he] sold to the firm for $12.1 million in December 2008
after financial stress forced margin calls.”); Anna Driver & Brian Grow, Special Report:
Chesapeake CEO Took $1.1 Billion in Shrouded Personal Loans, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2012,
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generosity seemed tied to the personal needs of its CEO, not to the
company’s performance.
To cover a margin call, 30 McClendon
involuntarily sold 30,000,000 shares of Chesapeake—or approximately
94% of the shares he owned—over the course of three days in October
2008. 31 Following those sales, the board responded, but not as the
market might have expected; 32 the board amended McClendon’s
employment agreement to reduce his required investment in
Chesapeake, 33 which weakened the link between his personal interests
and the interests of Chesapeake’s shareholders.
Chesapeake’s shareholders were restless, worried that the company’s
staggered-board governance regime unduly insulated the board members
and rendered them insensitive to shareholder concerns. Earlier in 2008,
a shareholder precatory proposal to de-stagger the board received
8:04 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/18/us-chesapeake-mcclendon-loans idUSBRE83H0GA20120418.
30. Loosely speaking, when one buys stock on margin, one buys on credit—with the
stock serving as collateral for the debt—but creditors become uneasy when the stock falls in
value. See generally Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate”
Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 993 (1992) (sourcing margin maintenance payments and
describing how a significant drop in stock price can force an investor to sell to make the
requisite payments); Eugene N. White, The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929
Revisited, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 67, 68 (1990) (referencing the “vertical price drops on Black
Thursday, October 24, and Black Tuesday, October 29, [that] forced margin calls and
distress sales of stocks, prompting a further plunge in prices”).
31. See Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Exhibit 99.2 (Oct. 14,
2008); Aubrey K. McClendon, Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4)
(Oct. 10, 2008). On October 7, 2008, McClendon owned 33,454,424 shares of Chesapeake,
and immediately after October 10, 2008, McClendon owned 1,931,501 shares of
Chesapeake. See Aubrey McClendon, Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form
4) (Oct. 10, 2008). Compare Chesapeake Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 28
(Apr. 29, 2008) (reflecting McClendon’s beneficial ownership of 29,529,975 shares of
Chesapeake), with Chesapeake Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 32 (Apr. 30,
2009) (reflecting McClendon’s beneficial ownership of 502,298 shares of Chesapeake).
32. John Bussey, The Business: What Chesapeake Owes Shareholders, WALL ST. J.,
May 11, 2012, at B1 (criticizing the board for failing to “tighten oversight of Mr.
McClendon because of his failed personal finances”); Schneyer et al., supra note 27
(discussing how McClendon selling over 90% of his shares “contributed to an 88 percent fall
in Chesapeake’s share price”).
33. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Exhibit 10.2.1 (Jan. 7, 2009)
(reducing McClendon’s required equity investment from 500% to 200% of his annual salary
and cash bonuses); Nell Minow, #payfail at Chesapeake Energy, CBS NEWS (June 15, 2011,
7:45 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-48140708/payfail-at-chesapeakeenergy/ (noting the board “allowed [McClendon] to amend his employment agreement to
reduce his required equity ownership when he had a margin call”).
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approval from a majority of those shares that voted. 34 In 2009, a
shareholder precatory proposal to de-stagger the board received
approval by a majority of outstanding shares. 35 As precatory proposals,
however, those proposals were non-binding; 36 only the board of
directors could initiate the change that shareholders desired. 37 Despite
the shareholders’ preference, the board was not legally required to
initiate, and did not initiate, any action to de-stagger the board. In 2010,
a particular shareholder entered the mix.
Famed corporate raider Carl Icahn, who strongly opposes staggered
boards, 38 acquired a stake in Chesapeake during the first quarter of
2010—a stake which continued to rise during the summer of 2010. 39
During 2010, Icahn became the second largest owner of Chesapeake
common stock. 40 Although Icahn commonly announces to the public the
34. See Chesapeake Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 15-18 (Apr. 29, 2008);
Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Exhibit 99.1 (June 19, 2009)
(reflecting approval by 61% of the votes cast, but only 45% of the shares outstanding).
35. See Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Exhibit 99.1 (June 19,
2009) (reflecting approval by 59% of the shares outstanding).
36. JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 537 (8th ed.
2013) (“Not infrequently, corporate managements have simply disregarded precatory
proposals that received a majority shareholder vote.”).
37. See 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1077 (2011) (requiring that amendments to the certificate of
incorporation be initiated by the board and then submitted to shareholders for approval).
38. Carl Icahn, The Absurdity of the Staggered Board, ICAHN REP. (June 15, 2008),
available at http://www.icahnreport.com/report/2008/06/the-staggered-b.html (passwordprotected site, material on file with author).
39. See Icahn Capital LP, Institutional Investment Managers Ownership Report (Form
13F) (May 17, 2010) (listing ownership of 2,122,949 shares of common stock of Chesapeake
Energy Corp. for the quarter ending on March 31, 2010); Icahn Capital LP, Institutional
Investment Managers Ownership Report (Form 13F) (Aug. 16, 2010) (listing ownership of
12,739,478 shares of common stock of Chesapeake for the quarter ending on June 30, 2010);
Icahn Capital LP, Institutional Investment Managers Ownership Report (Form 13F) (Nov.
15, 2010) (listing ownership of 16,643,030 shares of common stock of Chesapeake for the
quarter ending on Sept. 30, 2010). During 2010, Icahn controlled as much as 5.8% of
Chesapeake. See Carl C. Icahn, Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D) 16 (Dec. 17,
2010) (listing ownership of 38,629,417 shares of common stock of Chesapeake). However,
during the first quarter of 2011, Icahn sold the majority of his stake in Chesapeake. Compare
Icahn Capital LP, Institutional Investment Managers Ownership Report (Form 13F) (May
17, 2011) (listing ownership of 1,954,908 shares of common stock of Chesapeake for the
quarter ended March 31, 2011), with Icahn Capital LP, Institutional Investment Managers
Ownership Report (Form 13F) (Feb. 14, 2011) (listing ownership of 20,880,627 shares of
common stock of Chesapeake for the quarter ended December 31, 2010).
40. See Alex Cameron, McClendon: Don’t Fear the Raider (Feb. 24, 2011, 10:42 PM),
NEWS9.COM, http://www.news9.com/story/14136005/mcclendon-dont-fear-the-raider.
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changes that he would like implemented by the corporations in which he
has invested, 41 he remained relatively silent about his investment in
Chesapeake. 42 Icahn loomed as a threat to Chesapeake’s management. 43
Although he could not have run a rival slate of director-nominees at
Chesapeake’s 2010 annual meeting of shareholders, 44 Icahn continued to
accumulate shares of Chesapeake during the summer and fall of 2010, 45

41. See Bob Tita & Chelsey Dulaney, Ichan Takes Manitowoc Stake, Urges Split of
Crane and Kitchen Businesses, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2014, at B3.
42. See Ryan Dezember & Daniel Gilbert, Gas Titan’s Blueprint Rests on More Deals,
WALL ST. J., Jan 26, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240529702046242
04577183270372638912 (“Mr. Icahn was mum about his intentions . . . .”). Companies that
carry too much debt have prompted Icahn to invest and push for debt reduction, which
appears to have been a motivating factor for his investment in Chesapeake. See id.
(“[S]hortly after [Icahn’s] investment [,Chesapeake] unveiled a plan to trim long-term debt
25% by the end of 2012 . . . .”); see also Vinod Venkiteshwaran et al., Is Carl Icahn Good
for Long-Term Shareholders? A Case Study in Shareholder Activism, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.,
Fall 2010, at 45, 50 (noting Icahn’s historic practice of targeting firms that carry too much
debt). It was subsequently reported that debt-reduction at Chesapeake, in part, motivated
Icahn. See Cameron, supra note 40 (video at 2:05:00).
43. See generally Lilienfeld & Wissel, supra note 25, at 157 (“[I]n the event of an
uninvited change in ownership, a new owner may be more likely to terminate senior
management.”).
44. At its annual meeting to be held in June 2010, Chesapeake’s shareholders were
scheduled to elect three of nine directors. See Chesapeake Energy Corp., Proxy Statement
(Schedule 14A) 3 (Apr. 30, 2010) (setting forth business to be conducted). If Icahn had
wanted to nominate individuals for election to Chesapeake’s board at that meeting, then he
would have had to notify the company by March 14, 2010. See Chesapeake Energy Corp.,
Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 67 (Apr. 30, 2009) (“Our annual meeting of shareholders is
generally held on the second Friday of June. Assuming that our 2010 annual meeting is held
on schedule, we must receive notice of your intention to introduce an item of business at that
meeting no earlier than February 12, 2010 and no later than March 14, 2010. The chairman
of the meeting may disregard any nomination of a candidate for director or refuse to allow
the transaction of any business under a proposal if such is not made in compliance with the
procedures in our Bylaws or other requirements of rules under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.”). Despite accumulating shares of Chesapeake during the spring of 2010, Icahn
never notified Chesapeake of an intention to, and thus could not have, run a rival slate of
nominees for the director vacancies to be filled at Chesapeake’s 2010 annual meeting.
45. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing Icahn’s increasing stake in
Chesapeake). After Chesapeake promised “to sell off assets and pledged to pay down
debt[,]” its “stock climbed to $35.61 in February 2011, a level it hasn’t reached since.” Ryan
Dezember & Daniel Gilbert, Icahn Expected to Disclose Stake in Chesapeake, WALL ST. J.,
May 13, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023035055045774025
53480182824. A few weeks after Chesapeake issued that promise, Icahn liquidated enough
of his Chesapeake shares to fall below the 5% ownership threshold. Id. By reducing his
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suggesting that he would continue to push the company to implement
changes to increase shareholder value. Perhaps Icahn hoped to prompt
Chesapeake to make such changes without bearing the expense of trying
to unseat directors in 2010, 46 while preserving the possibility of doing so
in 2011. 47
The market trend against staggered boards 48—when added to the
shareholders’ precatory proposals to de-stagger Chesapeake’s board and
Icahn’s increasing ownership stake in Chesapeake—likely amplified the
pressure on Chesapeake’s management to de-stagger. 49 Bucking market
convention (e.g., the trend toward de-staggered boards) when contrary to
shareholders’ preferences can jeopardize a company’s future, as well as
holdings, Icahn ended his obligation to disclose such holdings. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)
(2012).
46. A proxy contest is the typical means by which a dissident shareholder gets her own
nominees elected to the board over those who were nominated by the corporation. Proxy
contests may be extraordinarily expensive. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 36, at 535–56.
While the corporation (and indirectly the shareholders) bears the expense of campaigning for
the corporation’s nominees, the dissident shareholder bears the expense of campaigning for
her nominees, see id. at 536. The high cost of the proxy contest and the concentration of
costs on the dissident serve as deterrents to launching a proxy contest. Id.
47. For example, Icahn has threatened to, and sought to, displace incumbent directors
with his preferred director nominees. See Annie Gasparro, Icahn Seeks Ouster of Clorox’s
Board, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2011, at B3 (noting Icahn’s statement of intent “to nominate
[eleven] people including himself, to replace Clorox Co.’s whole board”); Kerr-McGee Sues
to Fend Off Icahn, Investors, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/
mar/12/business/fi-Icahn12 (stating that after acquiring a sizeable minority stake, “Icahn and
Rosenstein . . . said . . . if Kerr-McGee continued to ignore their suggestions, they would
seek election as directors at the shareholder meeting in May.”); see also Icahn Capital LP,
Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D) Exhibit 1 (Dec. 6, 2011) (stating that Icahn
was prompted to launch a tender offer for Commercial Metals Co., after he “tried and failed
to reason with the Board and management . . . [regarding] the lack of good corporate
governance . . . includ[ing] . . . the retention of a staggered board”).
48. See infra Part I.C.1.a (charting market trend). See generally GLASS LEWIS & CO.,
PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES: 2012 PROXY SEASON 5 (U.S. ed. 2012) (“Glass Lewis favors the
repeal of staggered boards in favor of the annual election of directors. We believe that
staggered boards are less accountable to shareholders than annually elected boards.
Furthermore, we feel that the annual election of directors encourages board members to
focus on protecting the interests of shareholders.”); INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC.,
2011 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY 17 (2011) (“Vote AGAINST proposals to
classify (stagger) the board. Vote FOR proposals to repeal classified boards and to elect all
directors annually.”).
49. See Re-Jin Guo et al., Undoing the Powerful Anti-Takeover Force of Staggered
Boards, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 274, 282 (2008) (“The existence of prior shareholder proposals to
de-stagger the board . . . is strongly related to the firms’ decision to de-stagger.”).
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its managers’ futures with that company. 50 In the face of such pressure,
Chesapeake turned to the Oklahoma Legislature for relief during 2010.
If the legislature required Chesapeake (or rather, a more generic
category of companies that included Chesapeake) to have a staggered
board, then Chesapeake could not lawfully amend its charter to destagger its board, despite calls from shareholders or the market to do
so. 51 It merits emphasis that a staggered board of directors serves as an
anti-takeover device. 52
B. The Legislative Process of the 2010 Amendment
During 2009, the Oklahoma Legislature contemplated statutory
amendments regarding limited partnerships. The Senate and the House
passed separate versions of the same bill (each named the “Uniform
Limited Partnership Act of 2009”), but neither version was acceptable to
the other legislative body. 53 Those bodies formed two successive joint
conference committees, each of which produced an ultimately rejected
A third joint conference committee failed to reach any
bill. 54
agreement. 55 The 2009 legislative session ended without action on those
bills, none of which addressed corporate boards of directors.

50. See Che Odom, As Proxy Season Looms, Experts Offer Tips for Positive
Shareholder Votes, CORP. COUNS. WKLY., Jan. 25, 2012, at 25, 25 (Jan. 25, 2012)
(“[M]anagement must keep in mind the wishes of both major institutional investors and
proxy advisors when crafting its message.”).
51. See 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1006(B)(1) (2011) (“[T]he certificate of incorporation may
also contain . . . [a]ny provision for the management of the business . . . of the
corporation . . . if such provision[ is] not contrary to the laws of this State.”).
52. See Chesapeake Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 17 (Apr. 30, 2009)
(describing a staggered board as an “Essential Takeover Defense”).
53. See S. 1332, 52d Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2009); H. Amend. to S. 1132, 52d Leg., 1st
Sess. (Okla. 2009); see also Bill Information for SB 1132 (2009-2010), OKLA. ST.
LEGISLATURE, http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=sb1132&Session=1000 (follow
“History” hyperlink) (noting House Amendments to Senate Bill 1132 following initial passage
by the Senate, and then the Senate’s rejection of such amendments following passage by the
House and return to the Senate).
54. Bill Information for SB 1132 (2009-2010), supra note 53.
55. Id. (noting third conference committee edits were rejected and a further conference
requested).
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In March 2010, the Senate appointed conferees to a fourth joint
conference committee to resume discussions regarding the prior year’s
bills; the House named its conferees on April 27, 2010. 56 The conferees
apparently made little progress.
During the 2010 legislative session, Chesapeake resorted to the
Oklahoma Legislature for anti-takeover protection, but it did so too late
for the introduction of a new bill. 57 All was not lost for Chesapeake,
however, because Oklahoma’s legislative rules do not prohibit the
amendment of a timely introduced bill. Nonetheless, Chesapeake faced
another procedural hurdle, but one that was not insurmountable. The
Oklahoma Constitution generally requires that each bill address a single
subject, preventing Chesapeake from simply tacking its preferred
language to any existing bill. 58 Because there was an existing bill
concerning business law—The Uniform Limited Partnership Act of
2010—already before the state legislature, legislators revised that bill to
include the language favored by Chesapeake. 59 The enrolled bill totaled
115 pages, almost all of which dealt with limited partnerships and were
inapplicable to Chesapeake, a corporation. 60 Only the last few pages of
the bill—that is, only two substantive provisions—addressed corporate

56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Legislative Deadlines, OKLA. ST. LEGISLATURE, http://www.okhouse.gov/
legislation/LegislativeDeadlines.aspx (last visited Aug. 16, 2013) (setting forth deadlines for
bill draft requests, substantive language, and filing of legislation, all of which precede the
commencement of the session).
58. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 57 (“Every act of the Legislature shall embrace but one
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title . . . .”); Douglas v. Cox Retirement
Props., Inc., 2013 OK 37, ¶ 4, 302 P.3d 789, 792 (“This provision is commonly known as
the single-subject rule. The purposes of the single-subject rule are to ensure the legislators or
voters of Oklahoma are adequately notified of the potential effect of the legislation and to
prevent logrolling. . . . Logrolling is the practice of ensuring the passage of a law by creating
one choice in which a legislator or voter is forced to assent to an unfavorable provision to
secure passage of a favorable one, or conversely, forced to vote against a favorable provision
to ensure an unfavorable provision is not enacted.”). Because Chesapeake’s preferred
language would have amended an existing statutory provision, an exception to the singlepurpose requirement may have applied. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 57 (“except . . . bills
adopting a . . . revision of statutes”).
59. See S. 1132, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (as enrolled June 1, 2010). The
legislature revised the bill to include language that insulated Chesapeake from the threat of
an acquisition. See infra Part I.C.2.c.
60. S. 1132 passim.
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law. 61 The first of those substantive sections required staggered boards
for certain large corporations for a period of years, 62 and the second of
those sections limited the ability of shareholders of certain large
corporations to act without convening a meeting. 63
On May 25, 2010, the revised bill was read before the Senate. 64 The
Senate passed the bill on May 26, 2010, 65 and the House passed the bill
on May 27, 2010, 66 without question, objection, or debate, 67 just before
the conclusion of Oklahoma’s legislative session. 68 The Governor
signed the bill on June 7, 2010. 69
C. Criticisms of the 2010 Amendment
1. Criticisms of Substance
In 2010, the Oklahoma Legislature amended its code to require any
large, publicly traded corporation organized under the laws of the state
to have a staggered board of directors until 2015, after which time, such
a corporation could opt out of the requirement. 70 This amendment
dramatically altered the governance regime of those corporations to
which the statute applied.
Prior to the 2010 Amendment, the
legislature’s statutory default was a non-staggered board. 71 So, for
publicly traded corporations, the 2010 Amendment not only flipped the
61. Id. §§ 105-106 (as enrolled June 1, 2010). In essence, there were two substantive
provisions, and one procedural provision that provided an effective date for the substantive
provisions. Id. §§ 105, 106, 110 (as enrolled June 1, 2010).
62. Id. § 105 (as enrolled June 1, 2010).
63. Id. § 106 (as enrolled June 1, 2010). The second substantive section, which also
lessened the likelihood of a takeover, exceeds the scope of this article.
64. Bill Information for SB 1132 (2009–2010), supra note 53.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Okla. House of Representatives, House Session—Legislative Day 69, OKLA. ST.
LEGISLATURE (May 27, 2010), http://www.oklegislature.gov/ (follow “Video”; then follow
“House Video”; then follow “2010”; then follow “House Session—Legislative Day 69 May
27, 2010”; then follow “SB 1132 Sherrer” hyperlink) [hereinafter 2010 House Debate]
(quoting Rep. Ben Sherrer (D-Pryor Creek) at 6:25:45 regarding S. 1132, 52d Leg., 2d Sess.
(Okla. 2010)).
68. Note that May 27, 2010 was the last Thursday of the month. See OKLA. CONST. art.
V, § 26 (“The Legislature shall meet in regular session . . . and the regular session shall be
finally adjourned sine die not later than five o'clock p.m. on the last Friday in May of each
year.”).
69. Bill Information for SB 1132 (2009–2010), supra note 53.
70. S. 1132 § 105 (as enrolled June 1, 2010).
71. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1027(d) (Supp. 2009).
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statutory default, but also converted a statutory default—from which the
parties could deviate by agreement—into a statutory requirement for a
period of years. Prior to the 2010 Amendment, the legislature entrusted
to a corporation’s board and shareholders the decision of whether that
corporation should have a staggered or non-staggered board. 72 The 2010
Amendment legislatively displaced informed decisions by publicly
traded Oklahoma corporations—acting through their boards and
shareholders—to not have staggered boards. 73
If the Oklahoma Legislature believed that, for publicly traded
corporations, staggered boards are superior to non-staggered boards,
then the legislature should require staggered boards. But this the
legislature did not do, as it required staggered boards only until 2015,
after which the affected corporations could opt out. 74 If the Oklahoma
Legislature believed that publicly traded corporations—acting through
their boards and shareholders—should be free to determine whether to
have staggered boards, then the legislature should allow an opt-out of
the statutory default. But this the legislature did not do, as the opt-out
period did not begin until 2015. 75
a) Deviation from Market Trend
Did a market trend motivate the Oklahoma Legislature to require
staggered boards for its large, publicly traded corporations? No, for
large, publicly traded corporations, the market trended away from, not
toward, staggered boards. In 2004, over 50% of the S&P 500 companies
had staggered boards, but at the end of 2012, only 17% of the S&P 500
companies had staggered boards. 76 The Oklahoma Legislature was
bucking the market trend, and in so doing, it deviated from its common
refrain of favoring market solutions over legislative ones. 77

72. See id.
73. S. 1132 § 105 (as enrolled June 1, 2010).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
77. See generally 2013 House Debate, supra note 1 (quoting Rep. Cory Williams (DStillwater) at 58:37) (“Why in the world would we [legislators] be getting in the way of how
a corporation runs itself and how the shareholders elect their board?”); id. (quoting Rep.
Scott Inman (D-Oklahoma City) at 39:24) (“[W]e were asked to come in and run special
legislation that ran contrary to free market principles . . . . We’re going to restrict . . . how
corporations can do things for basically protectionist purposes . . . .”).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

236

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:221

S&P 500 Companies with Staggered Boards of Directors 78
300
250
200

Number of S&P
500 Companies
with Staggered
Boards of
Directors

150
100
50
0
200420052006200720082009201020112012

b) Statutorily-Mandated, Value-Reducing Corporate Governance
The market is probably trending away from staggered boards because,
generally speaking, staggered boards negatively impact firm value. 79
78. Daniel Gilbert, Oklahoma Board Rule Benefits Chesapeake, WALL ST. J., July 11,
2011, at B1 (noting that, in 2011, less than one-third of the companies comprising the S&P 500
had staggered boards, down from 53% in 2005); Martin Lipton, Some Thoughts for Boards of
Directors in 2013, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 31, 2012, 8:10
AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/12/31/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directorsin-2013/#more-38035 (noting that only 15% of S&P 500 companies had staggered boards at
end of 2012); SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT, THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT 2012
REPORT 8 (2012), available at http://srp.law.harvard.edu/releases/SRP-2012-Annual-Report.
pdf (noting that 126 S&P 500 companies had staggered boards at the end of 2011); Matteo
Tonello, Poison Pills in 2011, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 3,
2010, 9:49 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/04/03/poison-pills-in-2011/.
79. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN.
ECON. 409, 410 (2005) (“We find that, controlling for firm characteristics including other
governance provisions, staggered boards are associated with a reduced firm value. . . . [That]
is not only statistically significant, but also economically meaningful.”); Olubunmi Faleye,
Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 501, 503
(2007) (providing “evidence of a negative relation[ship] between firm value and classified
boards,” and showing that “this relation[ship] is robust to controls for other takeover
defenses and concerns for endogeneity”); id. at 514-15 (providing empirical evidence of
negative stock price reaction to announcements that corporations have staggered their boards
and positive stock price reaction to announcements of their elimination); Guo et al., supra
note 49, at 275-77 (concluding that the team’s empirical findings “make it much harder to
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The negative impact of staggered boards appears traceable to different
factors.
First, “a staggered board is [one of] the most powerful takeover
defense[s] available,” rendering other defenses irrelevant. 80 A staggered
board “increase[es] considerably” the likelihood of a corporation
If incumbent
fending off an unwanted acquisition proposal. 81
make the case that staggered boards are good for shareholders” because, among other things,
they found that cumulative abnormal returns were significantly and positively related to a
corporation de-staggering its board). Bebchuk and Cohen provide evidence suggesting that
“staggered boards at least partly cause, and not merely reflect, a lower firm value.”
Bebchuk & Cohen, supra, at 411, 426-28. Other studies generally suggest that anti-takeover
statutes decrease firm value. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the
Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043,
1045-46 (2003) (concluding that, following a state’s enactment of antitakeover legislation,
companies incorporated in that state suffered declines in productivity and efficiency); see
also Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107,
108-09 (2003) (concluding that firms with fewer antitakeover defenses “earned significantly
higher returns, were valued more highly, and had better operating performance”). A statute
that requires staggered boards would constitute an anti-takeover statute. See Michael
Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1353
(2013) (“If a firm has a staggered board, no other defense is relevant . . . .”).
Staggered boards need not be value reducing for each and every corporation, but,
rather than statutorily mandating staggered boards, a statute that permits corporate
participants to opt in to a staggered-board governance structure seems preferable.
80. Klausner, supra note 79, at 1353. In the presence of a hostile offer, staggered boards
are more likely to adopt poison pills than non-staggered boards. See Randall A. Heron &
Erik Lie, On the Use of Poison Pills and Defensive Payouts by Takeover Targets, 79 J. BUS.
1783, 1796 (2006). A staggered board coupled with a poison pill leaves a corporation
virtually takeover-proof. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 114, 129
(Del. Ch. 2011); Bebchuk et al., supra note 22, at 890-91. Whether or not a target
corporation has already implemented a poison pill, any potential acquirer must assume the
presence of a pill because one can be adopted quickly and without shareholder approval. See
John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific
Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 287-88 (2000). Note that Chesapeake previously adopted a
pill without shareholder approval. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K)
Exhibit 99.1 (July 16, 1998) (stating that Chesapeake adopted a shareholder rights plan).
Moreover, Chesapeake viewed a staggered board as an “essential takeover defense.” See
Chesapeake Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 17 (Apr. 30, 2009) (arguing
against shareholder’s proposal to de-stagger the board, and labeling a staggered board as an
“Essential Takeover Defense”).
81. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 79, at 414; Bebchuk et al., supra note 22, at 891
(“Specifically, we find that an [effective staggered board] nearly doubles the likelihood that
the average target . . . will remain independent, . . . halves the likelihood that the first bidder
will be successful, . . . and reduces the likelihood that a target will be forced to sell to a white
knight or other subsequent bidder . . . .”); see also Thomas W. Bates et al., Board
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management fends off a hostile proposal, shareholders generally are
worse off. 82 Theoretically, the higher premiums attributable to the
enhanced negotiating power of a staggered board might offset any
shareholder loss attributable to the occurrence of fewer transactions at
premiums over market prices. 83 Evidence, however, does not appear to
support this theory. Effective staggered boards (ESBs) “do not seem to
provide sufficiently large countervailing benefits for shareholders of
hostile bid targets, in the form of higher deal premiums, to offset the
substantially lower likelihood of being acquired. In fact, the evidence is
not sufficient even to conclude that [ESBs have] any positive effect . . .
on deal premiums.” 84
Second, staggered boards “benefit CEOs at the expense of
shareholders by shielding them and their compensation packages from
the effect of poor firm performance.” 85 To properly incent their CEOs,
corporations commonly award bonuses if corporate performance targets
are met. 86 Compared to annually elected boards, staggered boards set

Classification and Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from the Market for Corporate
Control, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 656, 665 (2008) (finding that targets with staggered boards respond
hostilely to acquisition attempts at twice the rate of targets without staggered boards); cf. id.
at 657-58 (finding that “targets with a classified board are ultimately acquired at an
equivalent rate as targets with a single class of directors,” but acknowledging that staggered
boards deter acquisitions).
82. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 22, at 891 (reporting reduced returns of 8–10%).
83. Id. at 935-36. See generally note 250
84. Bebchuk et al., supra note 22, at 936, 939 (arguing that the authors’ own study
understated shareholder losses because the study could not account for losses attributable to
bids that were deterred by staggered boards); id. at 891 (finding that “ESBs do not provide
sufficient countervailing benefits in terms of increased premiums and may even provide no
such benefits at all”).
If the shareholders of a corporation could relatively easily do away with a staggered
board, such as, for example, a shareholder-initiated bylaw amendment, then such a staggered
board would not be “effective,” according to Bebchuk and his coauthors. Id. at 894.
Oklahoma’s 2010 Amendment, which statutorily required staggered boards for large
publicly traded corporations, would likely result in an ESB for those companies.
85. Faleye, supra note 79, at 526; id. at 503 (“[T]he evidence suggests that [staggered]
boards are adopted for managerial self-serving purposes . . . .”); Harry DeAngelo & Edward
M. Rice, Antitakeover Charter Amendments and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 329,
329 (1983) (“Although inconclusive, the evidence provides weak preliminary support for the
hypothesis that antitakeover amendments are best explained as a device for managerial
entrenchment.”).
86. See supra note 25.
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lower, more easily achieved performance targets for their CEOs. 87
Compared to annually elected boards, staggered boards are less likely to
remove their CEOs. 88 Moreover, one would expect a tight link between
the removal of a CEO and underperformance by the corporation relative
to its peers; however, compared to an annually elected board, “a
[staggered] board significantly reduces the sensitivity of [CEO] turnover
to firm performance.” 89
Years ago, Massachusetts adopted a statute that generally requires its
Firms
publicly held corporations to have staggered boards. 90
incorporated in Massachusetts are worth less and receive fewer takeover
Compared to firms
bids than firms incorporated elsewhere. 91
incorporated in Massachusetts or other states with strong anti-takeover
statutes, 92 firms incorporated in Delaware are worth more and receive
more takeover bids. 93
87. Faleye, supra note 79, at 526; see also Gompers et al., supra note 79, at 133
(“[C]ompensation rises for CEOs of firms adopting takeover defenses.” (citing Kenneth A.
Borokhovich et al., CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments, 52 J. FIN. 1495
(1997))).
88. Faleye, supra note 79, at 503 (discussing empirical results of involuntary CEO
turnover rate of 30% at corporations with non-staggered boards compared to 16% at
corporations with staggered boards). Removal is lower if the CEO also serves as chairman of
the board. See Vidhan K. Goyal & Chul W. Park, Board Leadership Structure and CEO
Turnover, 8 J. CORP. FIN. 49, 59-60 (2002).
89. Faleye, supra note 79, at 524.
90. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, § 8.06 (2012).
91. Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525,
546 (2001). Daines addresses concerns about selection bias and endogeneity. Id. at 549-53.
92. Pennsylvania enacted the most extreme anti-takeover legislation, and corporations
organized under its laws suffered significant negative returns compared to corporations
organized elsewhere. See Samuel H. Szewczyk & George P. Tsetsekos, State Intervention in
the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310, 31 J. FIN.
ECON. 3, 4 (1992) (negative abnormal returns of 9.09% for 56 publicly traded firms, or
approximately $4 billion in shareholder wealth). Pennsylvania empowered corporations to
opt-out of the anti-takeover provisions, and those corporations that exempted themselves
entirely from those provisions generally experienced significant positive returns. Id. As is
typical, Pennsylvania enacted the legislation when one of its corporations was under siege by
a hostile acquirer, and legislators feared that an acquisition would result in job loss. Id. at 5.
Unions and other Pennsylvania corporations, whose membership and management arguably
benefitted by deterring others from attacking Pennsylvania corporations, supported the
legislation. See id. Not all Pennsylvania constituencies reacted favorably; the investment
manager of the state’s pension fund notified the legislature that passage of the legislation
would deter further investment in Pennsylvania corporations. See id. at 5, 17.
Both Indiana and Iowa recently enacted similar amendments to their respective
corporate codes. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-33-6(c) (LexisNexis 2010); IOWA CODE §
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c) Deviation from Delaware
Delaware is the nation’s leading provider of corporate law. 94
Delaware’s legislators annually update the corporate code, promptly
responding to the market’s needs. 95 Delaware’s specialized judiciary
promptly resolves corporate disputes. 96 Delaware’s time-tested, onehundred-year-old corporate code and its rich body of common law offer
guidance and predictability unrivaled by any other jurisdiction. 97
In 1986, thanks to the efforts of a subcommittee of the Oklahoma Bar
Association—the General Corporation Act Committee (OK Bar
Committee)—the Oklahoma Legislature essentially adopted Delaware’s
corporate code as its own. 98 The Oklahoma Legislature did so, in part,
to benefit from Delaware’s rich body of common law, 99 which would
guide Oklahoma corporations and their advisers and enhance the law’s
predictability. 100 By enacting Delaware’s corporate code, the Oklahoma
490.806A (2013). Iowa’s legislature acted to impede a hostile acquisition of one of its state’s
corporations. Matthew G. Doré, The Iowa Business Corporation Act’s Staggered Board
Requirement for Public Corporations: A Hostile Takeover of Iowa Corporate Law?, 60
DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE 1, 4–5 (2012), http://students.law.drake.edu/lawReview/docs/lr
Discourse201206-dore.pdf.
93. Daines, supra note 91, at 527-28. Interestingly, Chesapeake, which was once
incorporated in Delaware, reincorporated in Oklahoma in 1996. Chesapeake Energy Corp.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 6, 1997) (identifying its state of incorporation as
Oklahoma); Chesapeake Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 17 (Nov. 5, 1996)
(proposing reincorporation from Delaware to Oklahoma to save $150,000 annually in taxes
that would otherwise be paid to Delaware).
94. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 36, at 230–32.
95. Id. at 230.
96. Id. at 231.
97. Cleveland, supra note 12, at 1837–42, 1867.
98. Gary W. Derrick, News from OBA Sections: Report from the General Corporation
Act Committee of the Business Association Section, 62 OKLA. BAR J. 650, 657 (1991).
99. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 1983
OK 14, ¶ 8 n.7, 659 P.2d 930, 934 n.7; see also Brook v. James A. Cullimore & Co., 1967
OK 251, ¶ 5, 436 P.2d 32, 34; In re Estate of Fletcher, 1957 OK 7, ¶ 25, 308 P.2d 304, 311.
“A statute adopted from another state comes to [Oklahoma] burdened with construction
previously placed upon it by the highest court of that [other] state. This is so because
[Oklahoma’s] legislature is presumed to have been aware of such construction and to have
adopted the statute as so construed.” Atl. Richfield Co., ¶ 8 n.7, 659 P.2d at 934 n.7.
100. See Robert J. Melgaard, Business and Corporation Law: General Corporation Act
Committee, 69 OKLA. BAR J. 4107, 4127 (1998); cf. 2013 House Debate, supra note 1
(“[T]hat’s not a predictable situation for business. That’s not stable. . . . We’re changing our
corporation laws on a yearly basis to situate whoever brings the most lobbyists down to the
capitol.”) (quoting Rep. Cory Williams (D-Stillwater) at 57:57).
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Legislature adopted the Delaware Supreme Court’s interpretations of the
code. 101 Delaware’s chancery court decisions also guide Oklahoma’s
corporations, their advisors, and Oklahoma courts. 102
The OK Bar Committee monitors changes to Delaware’s corporate
code and periodically works with the Oklahoma Legislature to
implement those changes in Oklahoma’s corporate code. 103 By only
periodically updating Oklahoma’s corporate code to reflect amendments
to Delaware’s corporate code, the Oklahoma Legislature only
periodically adopts Delaware’s then-current common law precedent. 104
By enacting the 2010 Amendment, the Oklahoma Legislature
deviated from Delaware’s corporate code. 105 Delaware generally does
not require a staggered board for large, publicly traded corporations; 106
as a result of the 2010 Amendment, however, Oklahoma did require a
staggered board for large, publicly traded corporations. 107 The 2010
Amendment is another in a string of Oklahoma anti-takeover
amendments that deviate from Delaware’s corporate code. In 1987,
Oklahoma enacted the Control Share Acquisition Act, which generally
lowered the voting power of one’s shares as one’s holdings passed
certain thresholds. 108 Unlike the 2010 Amendment, which permitted no
opt-out for five years, 109 an Oklahoma corporation could promptly opt
out of the Control Share Acquisition Statute. 110 In 1991, acting contrary
101. Atl. Richfield Co., ¶ 8 n.7, 659 P.2d at 934 n.7.
102. See, e.g., Kurtz v. Clark, 2012 OK CIV APP 103, ¶¶ 17-28, 290 P.3d 779, 786-89
(looking to Delaware for guidance and citing decisions by Delaware’s supreme and chancery
courts).
103. Derrick, supra note 98, at 657.
104. See Melgaard, supra note 100, at 4127; see also In re Fletcher, ¶ 25, 308 P.2d at
311-12 (noting that, despite the legislature’s adoption of another state’s code, Oklahoma
courts are not bound by decisions of that other state that are subsequent to the time that the
Oklahoma legislature enacted the code).
105. Compare S. 1132, 52d Leg., 2d Sess., § 105 (Okla. 2010) (as enrolled June 1, 2010),
with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2011) (defaulting to annually-elected boards, but
permitting staggered boards through specified opt-in procedures).
106. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d).
107. S. 1132, § 105 (as enrolled June 1, 2010).
108. 18 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1145–1155 (2011).
109. S. 1132 § 105 (as enrolled June 1, 2010).
110. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1148(e)(2) (providing that a corporation will not be subject to the
act if the board of directors amends its bylaws to opt out within 90 days of the effective date
of the act).
When Chesapeake re-incorporated from Delaware to Oklahoma in 1996, it opted out
of the Control Share Acquisition Statute. See Chesapeake Energy Corp., Proxy Statement
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to the Delaware code, Oklahoma effectively prohibited shareholders of
large, publicly traded corporations from acting outside of meetings by
By lessening
requiring that shareholders act unanimously. 111
shareholders’ powers, the 1991 amendment indirectly enhanced the
powers of incumbent boards. In 2001, the Oklahoma Legislature turned
on its head the previously enacted Delaware provision concerning
bylaws, again generally lessening shareholder authority and enhancing
director authority. 112 These repeated deviations from Delaware leave
uncertain Oklahoma’s adoption of Delaware’s common law precedent,
at least within the realm of takeovers, which is an area that gives rise to
significant litigation because of the dollars at issue and the apparent

(Schedule 14A) 19 (Nov. 5, 1996) (noting that in recommending reincorporation from
Delaware to Oklahoma, “[t]he Company’s Board of Directors does not intend the
Reincorporation to result in additional anti-takeover protections. Therefore, Chesapeake
Oklahoma Certificate of Incorporation includes a provision whereby Chesapeake Oklahoma
will be excluded from the provisions of the Control Share Acquisition Act”).
111. Compare 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1073(b) (Supp. 2009) (generally permitting
shareholders of a publicly traded corporation with 1000 shareholders to act outside of a
meeting only if they do so unanimously), amended by S. 1132, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. § 106
(Okla. 2010) (as enrolled, June 1, 2010) (eliminating the prior possibility of opting-out via
the certificate of incorporation), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(a) (permitting
shareholders to act outside of a meeting; if unanimous approval were to be required, such
requirement would have to be set forth in the certificate of incorporation).
When Chesapeake reincorporated from Delaware to Oklahoma in 1996, it opted out
of the statutory default of unanimous consent by shareholders to act outside of a meeting.
See Chesapeake Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 19 (Nov. 5, 1996) (noting
that in recommending reincorporation from Delaware to Oklahoma, “[Oklahoma’s]
unanimous consent requirement is intended to effectively preclude action by written
shareholder consent and to require any shareholder vote to be taken at a meeting only after
proper notice and appropriate disclosure. To maintain Company shareholder’s voting rights,
the Chesapeake Oklahoma Certificate of Incorporation includes a provision permitting
voting by written shareholder consent”).
Though this article focuses on the staggered board amendment, in 2010, the
legislature required that, if the shareholders of large publicly traded corporations desired to
act outside of a meeting, they had to do so unanimously, without the possibility of opting out
of the requirement via the certificate of incorporation. S. 1132, § 106 (as enrolled, June 1,
2010) (amending 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1073).
112. Compare 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1013(A) (generally empowering the board to amend the
bylaws, but permitting the shareholders to do so if the certificate of incorporation so
provides), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (generally empowering the shareholders to
amend the bylaws, but permitting the board to do so if the certificate of incorporation so
provides).
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conflicts of interest. 113 These deviations undermine one of the principal
rationales for mirroring Delaware’s corporate code in the first place:
adopting Delaware’s common law enhances the predictability of
Oklahoma’s corporate law.
As the prior paragraph suggests, one of the benefits of Delaware’s
corporate code is that it provides an array of default rules, while still
enabling parties to tailor a corporation’s characteristics to suit their
needs. 114 In particular, Delaware generally provides that corporations
have non-staggered boards, but permits corporations to opt in to a
governance structure with a staggered board. 115 As a result of the 2010
Amendment, Oklahoma requires that large, publicly traded corporations
have staggered boards and prohibits any opt-out for a number of
years. 116 Given the trend against staggered boards, and the benefits of
maintaining consistency with Delaware, a default rule of non-staggered
boards, with the possibility of opting-in to a staggered-board governance
regime, seems preferable. 117
d) Faulty Premises
Some legislators exported their preferred management structure for
state-run organizations to the realm of privately run corporations. To
encourage populism, and to dampen the ability of a newly elected
governor to stock a state-run entity with cronies, the Oklahoma
Legislature generally requires that any such entity be governed by a
staggered board, whose members enjoy terms exceeding that of the
governor, and also generally limits the governor’s power to remove
incumbent managers. 118 Legislators, however, erred in exporting such a
management structure from state-run entities to privately run
corporations, as the 2010 Amendment does. State-run entities are likely
to heavily impact Oklahoma citizens, and if the citizens are dissatisfied
with state-run entities or with the checks on the governor’s ability to
remove or appoint managers, then a wide swath of citizens can either
113. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989);
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
114. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 36, at 229–30; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. 8 tit., §
102(b)(7) (permitting the elimination of specified types of director liability).
115. See DEL. CODE ANN. 8 tit., § 141(d).
116. See supra Part I.B.
117. Romano, supra note 11, at 186.
118. See, e.g., 70 OKLA. STAT. § 3302 (2011) (providing for seven-year staggered terms
for member of the Board of Regents). In Oklahoma, the governor serves a four-year term
and is term-limited. See OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
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lean on the legislature to amend the relevant statute or elect new
representatives that will amend that statute. On the other hand, the
managerial structure of a large, publically held corporation is likely to
heavily impact shareholders, but many of those shareholders will not
reside in Oklahoma and will be unable to prompt an amendment to an
Oklahoma statute. Consequently, the 2010 Amendment may concentrate
benefits in the state, but export costs on nonresidents. Every legislator
would like to concentrate benefits in the state while exporting costs to
nonresidents, but Oklahoma did so by altering the rules of the game expost.
Finally, some legislators assumed that if a staggered-board
requirement was favorable to one large, publicly traded corporation,
namely Chesapeake, then the requirement would be favorable for all
large, publicly traded corporations. This is not the case. The preceding
section, in part, explains the opt-in and opt-out provisions so prevalent
in both Oklahoma and Delaware’s corporate codes.
2. Criticisms of Process
a) Logrolling
The Oklahoma Constitution generally requires that legislative bills
address a single subject 119 to prevent logrolling. 120 Although it seems
that an exception to that requirement may have rendered the restriction
inapplicable in the case of the 2010 Amendment, 121 the framers’
concern—logrolling—loomed large. “Logrolling is the practice of
ensuring the passage of a law by creating one choice in which a
legislator . . . is forced to assent to an unfavorable provision to secure
passage of a favorable one . . . .” 122
During the 2010 legislative session, the proposed amendment to the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) was destined to fail. It had
failed during the 2009 session, and the legislature made little progress
during the first half of the 2010 session. Because of its size (onehundred-plus pages), the bill was expected to languish for several years
in the legislature as interested parties took time to review and comment
119. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 57 (“Every act of the Legislature shall embrace but one
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title . . . .”).
120. Douglas v. Cox Ret. Props., Inc., 2013 OK 37, ¶ 4, 302 P.3d 789, 792 (stating that
one of “[t]he purposes of the single-subject rule [is] . . . to prevent logrolling”).
121. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 57 (providing an exception for bills that “adopt[] a . . .
revision of statutes”).
122. Douglas, ¶ 4, 302 P.3d at 792.
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upon it. Eventually, the bill would likely have passed, but not during
the 2010 legislative session. Those knowledgeable about business law
generally favored the amendments to the ULPA, but opposed passage of
the staggered-board provisions that Chesapeake sought to append to the
ULPA bill. Those with political savvy suspected, however, that
Chesapeake’s preferred provisions would ultimately pass after being
appended to a bill, whichever bill that happened to be. Consequently,
some of those knowledgeable about business law were prepared to trade
a positive development in limited-partnership law for a negative
development in corporate law, because the negative development in
corporate law was forthcoming, whether or not in conjunction with the
ULPA bill. On the other hand, the legislators—who expected, and may
have preferred, that the amendments to the ULPA would take several
years—were prepared to expedite the process if adoption of the ULPA
amendments enabled them to deliver to Chesapeake its desired
protections under corporate law. Combining the ULPA provisions with
the staggered-board provisions ensured the bill’s passage. 123
Of course, the legislative process is entirely about compromise and
horse-trading, but the single subject constitutional provision exists to
ensure that such compromise and horse-trading occurs within the realm
of a single subject.
b) Evasion of Deadline
The framers designed the Oklahoma Constitution to provide
legislators with notice about the legislation on which they are called to
vote. 124 Moreover, the legislature imposes deadlines by which bills must
be introduced so that the legislators and the public are aware of the

123. Id. ¶ 6, 302 P.3d at 793 (“The purpose [of the constitutional requirement is] . . . to
prevent the Legislature from making a bill ‘veto proof’ by combining two totally unrelated
subjects in one bill.”). Depending on the level of abstraction, corporate law and limitedpartnership law may be related or unrelated. Both are related to business law; but there are
significant differences between the law regarding each entity, which is why the legislature
authorized the separate and distinct entities in the first place. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note
36, at 701-05.
124. See OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 34 (“Every bill shall be read on three different days in
each House, and no bill shall become a law unless, on its final passage, it be read at
length . . . .”); id. art. V, § 57 (“Every act of the Legislature shall embrace but one subject,
which shall be clearly expressed in its title . . . .”); Douglas, ¶ 4, 302 P.3d at 792 (stating that
one of “[t]he purposes of the single-subject rule [is] to ensure the legislators . . . of
Oklahoma are adequately notified of the potential effect of the legislation”).
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matters that legislators may address. 125 Such notice facilitates dialog.
Interested parties can alert legislators of the effect, including the
unintended consequences, of any proposed legislation; moreover, the
notice allows legislators time to initiate contact with the public to obtain
such information. 126
While the ULPA bill was submitted timely, the bill originally did not
address corporate law, so the public was caught unaware. 127
Importantly, as discussed in Part II.A, ONEOK and OGE, two of the
largest corporations operating in Oklahoma and organized under its
corporate code, were caught off-guard by the proposed amendment
regarding staggered boards. 128 Aside from some lobbying efforts on
Chesapeake’s behalf, there were no meaningful lobbying efforts in favor
of, or in opposition to, the proposed legislation. 129 Undoubtedly, neither
ONEOK nor OGE mounted any efforts in opposition because neither
was aware of the proposal. 130
Despite some suggestion to the contrary, there was no attempt to
smuggle the amendment through the legislative process. 131 Nonetheless,
the manner in which the legislative process operated likely left some
unaware of the import of the bill’s new staggered-board requirement for
125. See, e.g., 2013–14 Legislative Deadline Calendar, 2nd Session-54th Legislature,
OKLA. SENATE, http://www.oksenate.gov/schedule/deadlines.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2014);
Legislative Deadlines, 54th Legislature, 2nd Regular Session, OKLA. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.okhouse.gov/legislation/LegislativeDeadlines.aspx (last visited
Feb. 8, 2014); cf. Romano, supra note 11, at 125 (“Connecticut requires all bills for
consideration in a legislative session to be introduced by a specific date.”).
126. See Romano, supra note 11, at 125-26 (discussing Connecticut). In Connecticut,
[a] procedural advantage of the amendment process is that public discussion of
a bill may be bypassed. Connecticut mandates a public hearing for all bills
considered by the legislature, but there is no requirement that an additional
hearing be held on a bill that has been substantively amended after its
prescribed hearing. As a consequence, no public hearings were held on the
[anti-takeover] statute.
Id. at 126.
127. See infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
128. See infra Part II.A.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 2010 House Debate, supra note 67 (statement of Rep. Ben Sherrer (D-Pryor Creek)
at 6:25:54). When he introduced the bill on the floor of the House, Ben Sherrer specifically
stated that there had been provisions added at the end of the bill that dealt with corporate law
“relat[ing] to . . . staggered terms of board members,” but there were no questions regarding
the bill from other representatives, no objection to the bill’s adoption, and no debate on the
bill. Id.
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large, publicly traded corporations. Even if one is following a bill, the
content of a bill may change dramatically when conferees from the
House and Senate meet to resolve any differences, and the 2010
Amendment repeatedly proceeded through failed conferences before
emerging near the end of the legislative session. 132 The title of the bill
reflected its subject matter, 133 but because the bill itself totaled over onehundred pages, and the title of the printed bill spanned more than six
pages. 134 Changes to the title were virtually nonexistent and of little
consequence until its end. 135 The same goes for the essence of the bill,
which largely remained unchanged until the last few of those onehundred pages, which addressed corporate law. Most importantly, its
sponsors presented the bill for approval at the end of the legislative
session, when there is an onslaught of bills presented, 136 leaving
legislators little time to simply read bills, much less solicit constituent
reactions to them. 137
Oklahoma legislators subsequently acknowledged their failure to
properly vet the staggered-board requirement. “[I]n our haste to help
one company—one multimillion dollar corporation that hires thousands
of Oklahomans— . . . we neglect[ed] to put the word out enough so
another company who has a different viewpoint on [that bill] may not
know what it is we are doing . . . .” 138 Another legislator remarked,
132. See supra Part I.B.
133. S. 1132, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (as enrolled, June 1, 2010); see also OKLA.
CONST. art. V, § 57 (“Every act of the Legislature shall embrace but one subject, which shall
be clearly expressed in its title . . . .”).
134. S. 1132 (as enrolled, June 1, 2010).
135. See id.
136. See 3 Transcript of the Record at 193, State v. Terrill, CF-2010-8067 (D. Okla.
Cnty. 2013) (testimony of former Oklahoma Governor, Brad Henry: “[In the] last week [of
the legislative session] there are probably 2[00] to 300 bills . . . that passed both Houses and
end up on [the Governor’s] desk”).
137. See id. at 179 (testimony of Rep. Mike Christian: “Q[:] Do you and the other
representatives, in your experience, read every word of every bill that is voted on in the last
week of the session? A[:] I’m under oath, aren’t I? Q[:] You are. A[:] No. No. No, I don’t
read”); 5 Transcript of the Record at 20 (testimony of Rep. Chris Benge: “Q[:] . . . [I]s it
possible for you to read every word of every bill, as the Speaker of the House, before they go
onto the floor during those last two weeks of session? A[:] It’s not. Q[:] Basically, there’s
just not enough time in the day for you to look at everything; is that correct? A[:] That would
be correct. Uh-huh”).
138. 2013 House Debate, supra note 1 (quoting Rep. David Dank (R-Oklahoma City) at
43:36). One member of the House mentioned contacting a representative of an impacted
corporation, at the same time that the discussion on the floor of the House was ongoing, and
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“Whenever you go out and tamper with some [legislation] on the behest
of one CEO of a corporation in your state, you can really screw it up for
the rest of the state. 139
The failure to vet changes to the corporate law appears typical of
jurisdictions other than Delaware. 140
c) Special Interest
Every bill operates to someone’s benefit and to another’s detriment. 141
Consequently, special-interest legislation is inevitable, but the apparent
ease with which the 2010 Amendment benefitting Chesapeake sailed
through the legislative process, without proper vetting, is troubling.
Chesapeake presaged its legislative influence when it reincorporated
from Delaware to Oklahoma. 142 Corporations commonly reincorporate
to their home jurisdictions when concerned about future takeovers, in
hopes of achieving legislative favor. 143
Oklahoma legislators subsequently acknowledged that the 2010
Amendment amounted to special-interest legislation to benefit

alerted the members that there was no objection to the proposal. Id. (quoting Rep. Paul
Wesselhoft (R-Moore) at 44:30).
139. Id. (quoting Rep. Cory Williams (D-Stillwater) at 57:09).
140. See Romano, supra note 11, at 138 (“[Anti-]takeover statutes are approved . . . with
virtually no publicity . . . surrounding their introduction and passage.”).
141. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 394 (2000) (“[E]very law or
government policy ‘singles out’ some to bear a disproportionate burden for the benefit of
others . . . .”).
142. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 19 (Oct. 25, 1996)
(“The Oklahoma Legislature has responded to the needs of corporations organized under the
laws of Oklahoma through numerous amendments to the Oklahoma Act . . . .”).
143. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46
J.L. & ECON. 383, 398-403 (2003) (noting that firms incorporate in their home states to
influence corporate law); Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1590 (2002) (noting that firms concerned about future takeovers
incorporate in their home states due to favor paid by legislators to the home business).
At the time of its reincorporation to Oklahoma from Delaware, and to its credit,
Chesapeake did not avail itself of all of the anti-takeover protections afforded by Oklahoma.
See Chesapeake Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 18-19 (Oct. 25, 1996)
(opting out of Oklahoma’s Control Shares Acquisition Act). In retrospect, however,
Chesapeake’s articulated reason for the reincorporation—emphasizing excess annual
incorporation fees of two hundred thousand dollars—rings hollow when contrasted with its
compensation practices. Compare id. at 19, with Schneyer, supra note 27 (referencing a $75
million bonus for an executive untethered to corporate performance).
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Chesapeake and its CEO, at the expense of shareholders, by insulating
the company from the threat of an acquisition:
When we passed [the bill in 2010], . . . Chesapeake came in
here and told us we had to do this in order to protect
Oklahoma corporations from the likes of Carl Icahn. 144
[W]hy in the world would we [legislators] be getting in the
way of how a corporation runs itself and how the shareholders
elect their board? . . . It’s what Aubrey [McClendon] needed.
We bailed somebody out.” 145
As I recall th[e 2010] bill was run especially for one
corporation in the state of Oklahoma. It was a sweetheart
deal. 146
[W]e changed [the corporate code] to help one company . . . . 147
[We] . . . tamper[ed] with some[ legislation] on the behest of
one CEO of a corporation . . . . 148
Just because a lobbyist comes in and tells you [a legislative
amendment] . . . for the shareholder, doesn’t actually mean
it’s for the shareholder. 149
If you’ve got enough stroke out there, you can come in here
[to this legislative chamber] and change the rules whenever
you want. 150
[W]hen it benefitted a few in [2010], we were asked to come
in and run special legislation that ran contrary to free market
principles . . . . 151
d) Legislative Drafting Responsibilities
Few expect part-time state legislators to wield the pen when new bills
are drafted. 152 Although it is not uncommon for private parties to draft
144.
23:50).
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

2013 House Debate, supra note 1 (quoting Rep. Cory Williams (D-Stillwater) at
Id. (quoting Rep. Cory Williams at 58:37).
Id. (quoting Rep. Mike Reynolds (R-Oklahoma City) at 22:41).
Id. (quoting Rep. Joe Dorman (D-Rush Springs) at 36:12).
Id. (quoting Rep. Cory Williams at 57:09).
Id. (quoting Rep. Cory Williams at 59:24).
Id. (quoting Rep. Scott Inman (D-Oklahoma City) at 40:06).
Id. (quoting Rep. Scott Inman at 39:21).
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legislation, 153 given the risk of self-interest, the legislature must proceed
with caution. If the legislature can avoid relying on parties to draft
legislation that directly affects them, then the legislature should do so.
Chesapeake “participated in drafting” the portion of the bill that
required large, publicly traded corporations to have staggered boards. 154
The Oklahoma Legislature need not have relied on Chesapeake, as it
typically relies upon the OK Bar Committee to draft updates to the
state’s corporate code. 155
In 1984, the OK Bar Committee was formed to revise Oklahoma’s
The OK Bar Committee proposed statutory
corporate law. 156
amendments to the legislature, which adopted them in 1986. 157 Since
1986, the OK Bar Committee repeatedly has proposed updates to
Oklahoma’s corporate code that the Oklahoma Legislature has
adopted. 158 Moreover, when the Oklahoma Legislature previously
desired to amend the corporate code, it delegated drafting
responsibilities to the OK Bar Committee, even regarding anti-takeover
statutes. 159 After the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of
Indiana’s Control Share Acquisitions Chapter, an anti-takeover
statute, 160 the Oklahoma Legislature, which was then in session, tasked
the OK Bar Committee with drafting a similar act. 161 “[V]irtually
overnight,” the OK Bar Committee drafted a bill, which the legislature
enacted soon thereafter. 162
If the Oklahoma Legislature had turned to the OK Bar Committee to
draft the 2010 Amendment, the Committee would have rebuffed the
request, as a majority of the Committee opposed the staggered-board
152. See generally ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 417.
153. See, e.g., DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS ERA 46
(2012) (“Although the assignment of drafting a law was given to an interdepartmental
commission appointed by President Roosevelt, there is little doubt that Friendly, along with
other industry representatives, was the moving force in drafting the Civil Aeronautics Act.”).
154. Gilbert, supra note 78 (crediting Chesapeake’s outside counsel as the bill’s
architect).
155. Derrick, supra note 98, at 657.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (discussing a 1988 amendment by the Delaware legislature that prompted a 1989
amendment by the Oklahoma legislature).
159. See id. at 657-58.
160. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
161. Derrick, supra note 98, at 657-58.
162. Id. The Oklahoma Control Share Provisions can be found at 18 OKLA. STAT. §§
1145–1155 (2011).
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requirement. Nonetheless, legislators could have communicated that
their concerns (the general welfare of the state) extended beyond the
concerns of the OK Bar Committee (the general welfare of the
Oklahoma General Corporation Act), and sought advice on the
staggered-board requirement. Members of the OK Bar Committee could
have tailored the bill to suit the legislators’ goal (to protect Chesapeake)
while limiting the unintended consequences of the staggered-board
requirement. That is, a second amendment to the provision could have
been avoided.
In certain respects, Oklahoma has modeled itself after Delaware, the
leading provider of corporate law. Delaware relies upon a committee of
its bar association to draft updates to its corporate code, and so too does
Oklahoma in the typical case. 163 But, while Delaware relies upon a
multistep process that entails vetting and approval at each step within
the bar association before a proposed amendment reaches the
legislature, 164 Oklahoma displayed its willingness to bypass the OK Bar
Committee and not seek its reaction to the 2010 proposal. 165 Moreover,
Delaware would never entrust a single corporation with the
responsibility of drafting updates to its corporate code, as Oklahoma did
in 2010. 166

163. Hamermesh, supra note 12, at 1756.
164. Id. In Delaware, if a member of the bar committee (“Council”) suggests a possible
amendment to the corporate code, then the full Council will vote whether to explore the
proposal. Id. If the full Council approves, then the matter is delegated to a subcommittee of
Council to draft a proposal. Id. The full Council may reject any such draft and remand the
subcommittee’s initial draft for revisions. Id. If full Council approves of a draft, then the
draft is submitted to the Corporate Law Section of Delaware Bar Association and the Bar
Association’s Executive Committee. Id. With approval therefrom, the draft is presented to
the Delaware Legislature. Id.
165. Connecticut encountered a similar problem with its corporate statutes:
The Secretary of State’s office was not involved in the drafting of the takeover
provision and was not even aware of the addition to its bill until after the
amended bill was scheduled for a vote on the senate floor. The bar committee
was similarly not apprised of the amendment until the eleventh hour.
See Romano, supra note 11, at 126.
166. See Hamermesh, supra note 12, at 1758 (noting that Delaware “avoid[s] legislation
that would expose the General Assembly to criticism for favoring the parochial interests of
one corporation or for favoring local businesses over Delaware corporations headquartered
elsewhere”); Daines, supra note 91, at 540 (“Delaware’s unique political economy insulates
its legislature from the lobbying of firms subject to takeover bids . . . .”).
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D. Non-Corporate Law Explanations for the 2010 Amendment
As a matter of corporate law, the legislature acted unwisely in 2010
by requiring large, publicly traded corporations to have staggered
boards, even if only until 2015. So, why would the Oklahoma
Legislature have enacted the 2010 Amendment? Legislatures deal in
tradeoffs, and the legislature accepted a negative development in the
state’s corporate code to further other interests. 167 While the specialinterest legislation aided in further insulating McClendon and
Chesapeake’s board from challenge, the legislators’ concerns extended
well beyond Chesapeake’s corner offices. 168
Oklahoma has relatively few large corporations operating within its
If one of those corporations were acquired and its
borders. 169
headquarters moved to another jurisdiction, as commonly happens, 170
then Oklahoma would suffer significantly. 171 Job loss would be
expected, and unemployment costs would be high and persistent. 172
167. 2013 House Debate, supra note 1 (quoting Rep. Cory Williams (D-Stillwater) at
58:38: “[W]hy in the world would we [legislators] be getting in the way of how a
corporation runs itself and how the shareholders elect their board? . . . It’s what Aubrey
[McClendon, CEO & Chairman of Chesapeake] needed. We bailed somebody out.”); id.
(quoting Rep. Mike Reynolds (R-Oklahoma City) at 22:41: “[A]s I recall th[e 2010] bill was
run especially for one corporation in the state of Oklahoma. It was a sweetheart deal.”).
168. See Fred Morgan, Legislation Is Step in Right Direction, OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 27,
2010, at 9A (“Oklahoma public companies invest millions in capital on land, equipment and
plants. They produce thousands of jobs and they pay sizable taxes to our state to support
critically important education, health and social service programs and infrastructure. These
companies create jobs, and it is incumbent upon us as a state to provide policies and laws to
help . . . retain our existing companies.”).
169. See Oklahoma Stocks, SMALL CAP REVIEW, http://smallcapreview.com/oklahoma_
stocks.htm (last visited July 2, 2014).
170. See generally Mark Maremont, Election 2012: Behind Perry’s Jobs Success,
Numbers Draw New Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2011, at A1 (discussing the import of a
corporation’s headquarters to Houston and the addition of 820 jobs).
171. See infra note 186. The legislators’ concerns appear to have been well placed. See
Daniel Gilbert, Chesapeake’s Financial Web Complicates Notion of Sale, WALL ST. J., July
2, 2012, at B3 (noting that Icahn and another shareholder with significant holdings, who
caused an overhaul in the composition of Chesapeake’s board in 2012, have “advocated for
the company to consider a sale for a rich enough price”); Daniel Gilbert & Joann S. Lublin,
Corporate News: Chesapeake to Cut Costs, Open Board Nominations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8,
2013, at B2 (noting Chesapeake’s decision to cut overhead costs as well as “charitable,
political and trade-related spending by 30%, 40% and 50% . . . over the next three years”).
172. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and CostBenefit Analysis, 98 VA. L. REV. 579, 633 (2012) (“[C]ontrary to conventional wisdom in the
cost-benefit literature, unemployment costs are significant . . . .”); id. at 583 (“[R]ecent
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Chesapeake employs thousands of the state’s citizens, 173 and is one of
the state’s largest employers. 174 One would expect Oklahoma to benefit
from Chesapeake’s payment of corporate, sales, and excise taxes. 175
Chesapeake has contributed millions of dollars to the Oklahoma
community for charitable and educational purposes. 176 The author’s
employer, the University of Oklahoma, has benefitted from
Chesapeake’s generosity. 177 Not only does the company make such

literature has made clear that unemployment costs are high and persistent.”); see also infra
notes 186-88.
173. Miguel Bustillo, Chesapeake’s Hometown Woes: Oklahoma City Benefited from
Aubrey McClendon’s Boosterism and Largess, Which Now Is at Risk, WALL ST. J., May 29,
2012, at B1 (noting that the Chesapeake campus in Oklahoma City has more than 4600
workers).
174. OKLA. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MAJOR OKLAHOMA EMPLOYERS 1-2 (Spring/Summer
2010), available at http://www.digitalprairie.ok.gov/cdm/compoundobject/collection/stgov
pub/id/19594/rec/1 (compiling, without independently verifying, employee data, and listing
Chesapeake as the second largest energy industry employer, just behind ConocoPhillips and
just ahead of OGE).
175. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 710:50-17-5 (2011); INST. ON TAXATION & ECON.
POLICY, WHO PAYS? A DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE TAX SYSTEMS IN ALL 50 STATES
88 (3d ed. 2009), available at http://www.itepnet.org/whopays3.pdf; Bustillo, supra note
173 (noting that a Chesapeake subsidiary is among the ten biggest taxpayers in OKC). But
see INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY & CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, CORPORATE TAX
DODGING IN THE FIFTY STATES, 2008-2010, at 12 (2011), available at http://www.
itep.org/pdf/CorporateTaxDodgers50StatesReport.pdf (reflecting a negative average state
income tax for Chesapeake during the period of 2008-10); id. at 27 (reflecting a lower
average state income tax for the 2008-10 period for Chesapeake (-2.1%) than other large
Oklahoma-based corporations—Devon Energy (0.6%), The Williams Companies (1.0%), or
ONEOK (1.1%)).
176. See Daniel Gilbert, Oklahoma City Fears an End to Chesapeake’s Largess, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 7, 2013, at B1 (stating that rumored cutbacks on spending “worries . . . local
government officials, nonprofit leaders and . . . sports fans, all of whom have benefited from
the largess of Chesapeake and its co-founder and chief executive”); Gilbert & Lublin, supra
note 171 (“Chesapeake spent more than $56 million on charitable causes between 2010 and
2011 . . . .”); Keeping Oklahoma Green, CMTY. TIES (Chesapeake Energy Corp., Okla.)
Winter Ed. 2011, at 2 (describing the corporation’s contribution of 2000 trees at no cost to
communities across the state); Lending Santa a H.E.L.P.ing Hand, CMTY. TIES (Chesapeake
Energy Corp., Okla.) Winter Ed. 2011, at 1 (describing the corporation’s contributions to the
Salvation Army during the holiday season); Notes of Appreciation: Chesapeake Funds
Instruments and Private Lessons for Music Students, CMTY. TIES (Chesapeake Energy Corp.,
Okla.) Winter Ed. 2011, at 2-3 (describing the corporation’s contributions to an Oklahoma
City school that facilitated music lessons and the purchase of musical instruments).
177. See Incoming Student Scholarships, UNIV. OF OKLA. COLL. OF LAW, http://www.
law.ou.edu/content/scholarships (last visited Feb. 11, 2012) (“The Chesapeake Energy
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contributions to the Oklahoma community, but so do its employees. 178
Aubrey McClendon has been exceptionally generous to various schools
in the state, again including the author’s employer, the University of
Oklahoma. 179
Oklahoma previously has seen the headquarters of significant
corporations depart the state. For example, the headquarters of Phillips
Petroleum and Kerr-McGee each departed Oklahoma for Texas. In the
1920s, the Phillips brothers organized Phillips Petroleum Company and
based its headquarters in Bartlesville, Oklahoma. 180 During the 1980s,
Carl Icahn and T. Boone Pickens each attempted a hostile acquisition of
Phillips, but the company remained independent for the remainder of the
century. 181 Then, in 2002, Conoco acquired Phillips, and the combined
company’s corporate headquarters relocated to Texas. 182 When Conoco
officials contemplated moving the corporate headquarters from

Corporation Scholarship is awarded to incoming students with a demonstrated interest in the
oil and gas industry.”).
178. Bustillo, supra note 173 (noting that one-quarter of donations to the United Way of
Central Oklahoma came from employees of Chesapeake ($5.5 million of $22 million)).
179. See, e.g., id. (McClendon “shower[ed] arts groups and schools with millions in
donations . . . .”); Gilbert, supra note 176 (stating that Chesapeake’s former CEO, Aubrey
McClendon, had “pledged to donate to Oklahoma schools the amount of fees Chesapeake
pays for naming rights multiplied by his ownership stake in the team[,]” which is 19%);
McClendons Give $12.5 Million to Support Various Academic and Athletics Projects at OU,
UNIV. OF OKLA.: GIVE TO OU (May 8, 2008), http://www.ou.edu/give/about/news_/
mcclendons_give_12.html.
180. Our History 1909-1929, CONOCOPHILLIPS, http://www.conocophillips.com/who-weare/our-legacy/history/Pages/1909-1929.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
181. See William Gruber, Raider Carl Icahn—A Pirate or a Patriot?, CHI. TRIB., May 12,
1985, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-05-12/business/8501290769_1_raider-carl-icahnphillips-petroleum-motive (“Icahn’s targets have included Phillips Petroleum . . . .”); see also
Mesa Partners v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 488 A.2d 107 (Del. Ch. 1984) (granting T. Boone
Pickens’ request for declaratory judgment that Phillips did not benefit from a standstill
agreement protecting a company that had been acquired by Phillips).
182. See Our History 1990-Present, CONOCOPHILLIPS, http://www.conocophillips.com/
who-we-are/our-legacy/history/pages/1990-present.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 2014); see also
ConocoPhillips Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 25, 2012). Interestingly, a predecessor
of Conoco—Marland Oil Company—was founded in Ponca City, Oklahoma, but, in the
1920s, J.P. Morgan Jr. ousted Mr. Marland and caused the company to merge with
Continental Oil and Transportation Co., which became Conoco. Our History: 1909-1929,
supra note 180. Conoco relocated its headquarters to Houston, Texas, well before its
transaction with Phillips. Rod Walton, ConocoPhillips Jobs in Jeopardy, TULSA WORLD
(Nov. 8, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://tulsaworld.com/business/energy/conocophillips-jobs-injeopardy/article_6620c770-a27a-591d-b568-b390535f19a1.html.
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Oklahoma to Texas, Oklahoma politicians expressed concern about the
potential job loss in Oklahoma and hoped to appeal to Conoco’s CEO,
who hailed from Oklahoma. 183 If the corporate headquarters departed
Oklahoma, then high-paying, white-collar jobs would also depart the
Oklahoma politicians tried to retain the corporate
state. 184
headquarters—and those high-paying, white-collar jobs—by discussing
the elimination of state income tax, which Texas had previously
eliminated. 185 Beyond those high-paying jobs, Oklahoma politicians and
residents were also concerned about lower-paying, white-collar jobs, as
well as blue-collar jobs, and the ripple effect that would occur if those
jobs were eliminated. 186 Initially, Conoco officials remained vague on
the topic of job cuts in Oklahoma. 187 Eventually, the headquarters
departed the state (and so, too, did the highest-paying jobs), and the
merger precipitated job loss in certain Oklahoma communities. 188

183. Associated Press, Keating to Urge Conoco to Return to Oklahoma from Texas,
LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-J., Dec. 11, 2001, http://lubbockonline.com/stories/121101/upd_
phillips.shtml.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Danny M. Boyd, Conoco Merger Worries Okla. Town, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 20,
2001, 3:56 AM), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2001/Conoco-Merger-Worries-Okla-Town/ide27a388bd38893866365733d2f44e2bb; Beverly Bryant, City Leaders React to Announcement,
PONCA CITY NEWS, Feb. 17, 2009, at 1A (quoting city manager, “[It’s] about more than jobs and
money . . . ‘These are our friends and neighbors, so it’s much more personal’”).
187. Keating to Urge Conoco to Return to Oklahoma from Texas, supra note 183.
188. ConocoPhillips to Close Ponca City Demonstration Plant, VICTORIA ADVOC., Oct. 31,
2004, at 1C (discussing the elimination of 120 jobs); Rod Walton, Ponca City Losing Hundreds
of ConocoPhillips Jobs, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 17, 2009, http://www.tulsaworld.com/archives/
ponca-city-losing-hundreds-of-conocophillips-jobs/article_27f4c42f-95d4-51a3-8c16-c8532d3
81304.html (discussing the relocation of 750 non-refinery positions); Michael Overall, Video:
Life After Conoco: Losing ‘the Company’ Changes Ponca City, TULSA WORLD, June 28, 2009,
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/local/video-life-after-conoco/article_99ff4115-004f-5adc-a2
da-cfece5f751e6.html?mode=story) (quoting a former employee that employment with the
company once was “‘the ultimate prize . . . [providing] a job for life and . . . a sense of
security and stability’”). It merits mention that, while the merger resulted in the migration of
higher-paying, white-collar jobs from Oklahoma to Texas, many jobs in Oklahoma simply
migrated from one location in Oklahoma (Ponca City, OK) to another location in Oklahoma
(Bartlesville, OK). Id.; Walton, supra. The merger did not hurt Bartlesville as much as many
feared. Murray Evans, Okla. Towns Eye Split of ConocoPhillips Operations, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (July 14, 2011), http://businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9OFNI1O0.
htm. Nonetheless, given reasonable concerns, politicians will not wait and hope for the best;
but instead, will act to preempt job loss and the negative ripple effect to the extent that they
are able.
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Beyond jobs, Phillips contributed to the Bartlesville community.
Phillips gave millions of dollars to local charities and donated to a local
museum a multi-million dollar building, which was designed by Frank
Lloyd Wright. 189 With the departure of the highest-paying jobs, the
community suffered. 190
In 2005, Carl Icahn once again rattled a company based in Oklahoma.
By late 2004, Icahn had acquired a sizeable stake in Kerr-McGee. 191
Knowing that Icahn, his ownership stake, and his clout could influence
other shareholders’ votes, Kerr-McGee filed suit in hopes of voiding any
votes cast by Icahn and barring his acquisition of additional shares of
the company. 192 Icahn reported that, if Kerr-McGee ignored his
suggestions for improving shareholder value, he would seek to elect
others to the company’s board. 193 The parties settled the suit, with Icahn
agreeing not to unseat any incumbent directors and Kerr-McGee
agreeing to buy back four billion dollars of its shares at “prices that
would represent all-time highs.” 194 Soon after a company fends off a
hostile acquirer, the company commonly agrees to be acquired in a
friendly transaction; 195 such was the case for Kerr-McGee, which agreed
to be acquired in 2006 by Anadarko Petroleum Corporation. 196 The
combined company located its headquarters in Houston, Texas, where
Anadarko was headquartered. 197 Because of redundancies between the
headquarters, Anadarko eliminated many of the two hundred jobs that
previously existed in Oklahoma, 198 many of which were high-paying

189. Boyd, supra note 186.
190. See supra note 188-89 and accompanying text.
191. See Carl. C. Icahn, Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D) (Apr. 18, 2005).
192. See Kerr-McGee Sues to Fend Off Icahn, Investors, supra note 47.
193. See id.
194. See TSC Staff, Icahn Gets Rich Price from Kerr-McGee, THESTREET (Apr. 14, 2005),
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10217543/1/icahn-gets-rich-price-from-kerr-mcgee.html.
195. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Martin M. Cohen,
“Poison Pills” as a Negotiating Tool: Seeking a Cease-Fire in the Corporate Takeover
Wars, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 459, 508.
196. See Don Mecoy, Oklahoma Losing Landmark Corporate Headquarters, NEWSOK
(June 23, 2006), http://www.newsok.com/oklahoma-losing-landmark-corporate-headquar
ters/article/1877190.
197. Id.
198. See Don Mecoy, Departure to Be Blow for City, NEWSOK (June 24, 2006), http://
www.newsok.com/departure-to-be-blow-for-city/article/1877406; Mecoy, supra note 196.
(quoting Anadarko’s chairman and chief executive officer, who stated that those individuals
previously working at the Oklahoma headquarters were “most at risk”).
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jobs of the sort that Oklahoma tries to attract. 199 During 2004, KerrMcGee paid “more than $85 million in payroll and benefits in
[Oklahoma].” 200 While lamenting the negative economic impact KerrMcGee’s departure caused, the President of the Greater Oklahoma City
Chamber of Commerce regretted losing part of the “fabric of the
community.” 201
Kerr-McGee’s corporate leaders also contributed to the Oklahoma
City community. For example, after visiting Denmark and being
impressed by the Tivoli Gardens, Dean McGee worked with civic
leaders to create the Myriad Gardens in downtown Oklahoma City. 202
Moreover, he “endowed the eye institute at the [University of
Oklahoma] Health Sciences Center that bears his name.” 203
Although the departures from Oklahoma of Phillips and KerrMcGee’s corporate headquarters may have harmed the state, Oklahoma
legislators could not have prevented their departures by amending
Oklahoma’s corporate code, 204 because neither company was
incorporated in Oklahoma, 205 rendering its corporate code inapplicable
to both companies. 206 In contrast, because Chesapeake is incorporated
under Oklahoma law, Oklahoma could amend its corporate code to
protect Chesapeake.

199. Mecoy, supra note 198 (quoting Oklahoma City mayor). It is worth noting that, given
its far-flung operations, many Kerr-McGee jobs were not located in Oklahoma. See Don
Mecoy, Corbett Believes He Kept Promise on City Location, NEWSOK (June 24, 2006),
http://www.newsok.com/corbett-believes-he-kept-promise-on-city-location/article/1877414
(indicating that only 206 jobs located in Oklahoma City, with largest operations in Denver and
Houston).
200. Mecoy, supra note 198.
201. Id.
202. Bill O’Brien, Kerr McGee’s Civic Impact Will Outlast Its Move Away from OKC,
EDMOND SUN, July 11, 2006, http://www.edmondsun.com/opinion/kerr-mcgee-s-civic-impactwill-outlast-its-move-away/article_a3cada96-1441-5225-8056-e039d6c05e5f.html.
203. Id. See generally Our Story, DEAN MCGEE EYE INST., http://www.mei.org/our-story
(last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
204. The Oklahoma Legislature did hastily enact a statute designed to impede Conoco’s
efforts to acquire Phillips by requiring the approval by a state commission of certain
transfers of energy resource assets. See S. 143, 40th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 1985). However,
the statute fell to a constitutional challenge. Mesa Partners II v. Unocal Corp., 607 F. Supp.
624, 629-30 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
205. See Kerr-McGee Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Aug. 10, 2006) (noting
incorporation under Delaware law); Phillips Petroleum Co., Current Report (Form 8-K)
(Nov. 16, 2000) (same).
206. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing internal affairs doctrine).
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States may act to retain corporations that are being wooed by other
states or that are under attack by hostile acquirers. 207 For example, the
State of Washington acted quickly when Boeing—headquartered in
Seattle—was under attack by a hostile acquirer, and Massachusetts acted
quickly when Gillette—headquartered in Boston—was under attack by a
hostile acquirer. 208 In 2010, the Oklahoma Legislature acted to protect
one of its corporations to further statewide interests.
As noted in the prior section, Delaware’s political economy does not
allow for special-interest legislation benefitting one corporation that is
facing a hostile acquisition. 209 Delaware’s statutory code attracts many
corporations that are headquartered and operated in other states. 210
Therefore, “[t]he direct political salience of other interests (such as
corporate employees . . . [and] citizens affected by corporate
behavior . . .) is not vivid in influencing Delaware lawmakers. Those
other interests neither vote in Delaware elections nor [do they] directly
provide franchise fees.” 211 Consequently, Delaware “will not tilt its
corporation law to favor a corporation that happens to have its
headquarters [in the state] . . . . The cost to [its] integrity and [its] ability
to preserve [its] advantage . . . would be too high.” 212 Because
Oklahoma has not made a comparable investment in its corporate code

207. OESTERLE, supra note 11, at 615-16. Such competition may manifest itself in
various ways, including lowered state taxes, enhanced employee training, and construction
of new roads, schools, or facilities. See id.
208. See id. at 615.
209. Daines, supra note 91, at 540 (“Delaware’s unique political economy insulates its
legislature from the lobbying of firms subject to takeover bids . . . .”); id. at 541 (“[T]arget
managers typically win entrenching legislation from state legislators by arguing that a
takeover will reduce local employment levels.”); see id. at 542 (discussing the legislative
response by the Arizona legislature when one of its corporations–Greyhound–was
threatened).
210. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(a) (2011) (In Delaware, “[a]ny person . . . without
regard to such person’s . . . residence . . . may . . . organize a corporation”); id. § 131(a)
(“Every corporation shall have and maintain in [Delaware] a registered office which may,
but need not be, the same as its place of business.”).
211. Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote and Its Political Economy in
Delaware and in Washington, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 29 (2012), available at http://www.
hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/HLB204.pdf.
212. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the
New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 680 (2005); see also
Hamermesh, supra note 12, at 1759 (“It is just not that hard to leave client interests at the
door when those interests are so diverse that any particular initiative will be attractive to
some clients but unattractive to others.”).
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and does not rely upon annual fees from corporations to the extent that
Delaware does, 213 Oklahoma appears more willing to accept a negative
development in its corporate code to assuage the concerns of a single
corporation.
II. The 2012 Amendment
A. Events Leading to the 2012 Amendment
The 2010 Amendment caught many unaware. Corporate lobbyists
were caught off guard, in part because the bill originally did not address
staggered boards or corporations and, when revised without publicity to
address staggered boards and corporations, 214 there were only a few days
Hearing only from
remaining in the legislative session. 215
representatives of Chesapeake, legislators wrongly assumed that, if the
2010 Amendment benefitted one publicly traded Oklahoma corporation
(Chesapeake), then it would benefit all publicly traded Oklahoma
corporations (such as ONEOK and OGE). Legislators did not test their
assumption, in part because limited support staff does not allow much in
the way of constituent outreach 216 and in part because the bill was
presented for approval at the end of the legislative session, when there is
an onslaught of bills presented, leaving little time to read bills, much
less solicit constituent reaction to them. 217
Having never been consulted regarding the 2010 Amendment,
ONEOK proceeded with its annual meeting of the shareholders in 2011,
as if the 2010 Amendment had not been enacted. 218 This proved
213. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 36, at 230 n.9 (noting that, in 2011, Delaware
collected $854 million in incorporation fees, which amounted to 26% of its “tax” income).
214. See 2013 House Debate, supra note 1 (quoting Rep. David Dank (R-Oklahoma
City) at 43:45: “[S]ometimes we neglect to put the word out enough so another company
who has a different viewpoint on [that bill] may not know what it is we are doing . . . .”). See
generally Romano, supra note 11, at 138 (“[Anti-]takeover statutes are approved by wide
margins . . . with virtually no publicity . . . surrounding their introduction and passage.”)
(emphasis added).
215. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
216. See generally Romano, supra note 11, at 136.
217. See supra note 137.
218. In February 2010, at the request of two members of the OK Bar Committee, the
chair of the committee circulated to other committee members a proposal to amend the
corporate statute (which was subsequently enacted in the form of the 2010 Amendment). A
member of the committee was associated with ONEOK, and should have received notice of
the proposal, and could have surmised who was ultimately responsible for the proposal, but
that committee member does not recall receiving notice of the proposal; so it never occurred
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problematic for ONEOK. In 2008, consistent with the preferences of its
shareholders, ONEOK de-staggered its board of directors, so that
shareholders annually could elect the entire board, 219 which shareholders
did in 2009 and 2010. 220 And, unaware of the 2010 Amendment,
ONEOK did likewise in 2011, inviting shareholders to elect the entire
board, 221 contrary to the 2010 Amendment. 222 Soon after the 2011
annual meeting of shareholders, ONEOK learned of the 2010
Amendment and that it had just held an election of directors inconsistent
with the 2010 Amendment. 223
ONEOK was confounded: “[W]e are disappointed that the legislature
took this action and did so in a manner that did not afford us, as the
largest publicly traded company in Oklahoma, the opportunity to
participate in the debate regarding the advisability of this legislation.” 224
ONEOK was particularly troubled in light of its recent actions to de-

that such a statutory amendment was a possibility. A vast majority of the committee
members responded negatively to the proposal, but the proponents proceeded individually
and without support of the committee, and that proposal was implemented in the form of the
2010 Amendment. Some committee members, recognizing that such amendment would
pass, favored its addition to the ULPA to ensure its passage. See supra Part I.C.2.a.
219. See ONEOK, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) Item 5.03 (May 19, 2008) (discussing
shareholder approval of an amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation to “eliminate the
classified structure of [the] Board of Directors and provide for the annual election of
directors”).
220. See ONEOK, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 2 (Mar. 26, 2010) (“The 2010
annual meeting of shareholders of ONEOK, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, will be held . . .
for the following purposes: . . . to elect the 12 directors named in the accompanying proxy
statement to serve a one-year term . . . .”); ONEOK, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 2
(Mar. 27, 2009) (“The 2009 annual meeting of shareholders of ONEOK, Inc., an Oklahoma
corporation, will be held . . . for the following purposes: . . . to elect the 11 directors named
in the accompanying proxy statement to serve a one-year term . . . .”).
221. ONEOK, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 2 (Apr. 4, 2011) (“The 2011 annual
meeting of shareholders of ONEOK, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, will be held . . . to
consider and vote on . . . election of the 11 directors named in the accompanying proxy
statement to serve a one-year term . . . .”).
222. See supra Part I.B.
223. ONEOK, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) Exhibit 99.1 (June 23, 2011) (“We
recently learned that the Oklahoma legislature – in the waning days of the 2010 session –
passed last-minute legislation requiring [corporations, such as ONEOK] to have classified,
or staggered, boards of directors. . . . As a result, the directors of ONEOK have been
classified automatically by the Oklahoma statute into three classes with staggered terms of
office, rather than all of the directors being part of a single class and elected annually, as
mandated by our certificate of incorporation.”).
224. Id.
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stagger its own board: “We continue to believe that [the] decision [by
our] shareholder[s] to have an annual election [for all] directors is
consistent with best practices in corporate governance.” 225 John
Gibson—President, CEO, and Chairman of ONEOK—expressed
concern to Oklahoma’s governor about the staggered-board requirement,
and the governor expressed her commitment to working with ONEOK
and the Oklahoma Legislature to develop a solution. 226
The 2010 Amendment also came as a surprise to OGE. Following
nonbinding shareholder votes in 2008 and 2009 to de-stagger its board
of directors, OGE’s board of directors, in 2010, unanimously proposed
to shareholders that the company amend its corporate constitution to
require an annual election of the entire board. 227 To implement
shareholder will, the board made its recommendation, notwithstanding
the fact that a classified board is “a useful tool in the event of a coercive
takeover attempt.” 228 With overwhelming approval from shareholders,
OGE essentially declassified its board on May 20, 2010. 229 That is,
OGE de-staggered its board of directors one week before the 2010
Amendment passed both houses of the Oklahoma Legislature, and fewer
than three weeks before the governor signed the bill. 230 OGE likely
would not have gone to such trouble to de-stagger its board if it had
been aware of the looming legislative efforts to require staggered
boards. Moreover, OGE likely would have expended lobbying efforts
against the 2010 Amendment if it had been aware of the legislature’s
intentions.

225. Id.
226. Id.
227. OGE Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 17–18 (Mar. 31, 2010). Destaggering the board of directors requires that the proposal be initiated by the board and
subsequently approved by shareholders. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1006 (2011). Therefore, the
shareholders’ votes in 2008 and 2009, which were not preceded by approval by the board,
were nonbinding. See id.
228. OGE Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 17 (Mar. 31, 2010).
229. OGE Energy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 25, 2010) (setting forth the
results from the May 20th meeting of shareholders: 81,978,404 in favor of de-staggering the
board; 1,153,131 against de-staggering the board; and 685,956 abstaining). OGE
“essentially” declassified its board on that date because Oklahoma state law requires
compliance with formalities, in addition approval by the board and shareholders. 18 OKLA.
STAT. § 1007.
230. Bill Information for SB 1132 (2009–2010), supra note 53 (setting forth the dates of
actions by the House, Senate, and Governor).
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In 2012, lobbyists for each of ONEOK and OGE worked with
legislators, convincing them that the 2010 Amendment had been
overbroad to achieve its purposes. 231 Legislators acknowledged their
error: “[I]n our haste to help one company—one multimillion dollar
corporation that hires thousands of Oklahomans [i.e., Chesapeake]—that
sometimes we neglect to put the word out enough so another company
who has a different viewpoint on [that bill] may not know what it is that
we are doing . . . . 232 Another legislator remarked, “[W]henever you go
out and tamper with some[ legislation] on the behest of one CEO of a
corporation in your state [i.e., McClendon of Chesapeake], you can
really screw it up for the rest of the state. 233
After acknowledging their error, the legislators responded.
B. The Legislative Process of the 2012 Amendment
Due to the positions of ONEOK and OGE, the bill became a
legislative priority, and sponsors introduced it in the House of
Representatives on the first day of the legislative session. 234 The bill
passed each of the House and the Senate without objection, and was
signed by the governor less than a month after being introduced in the
House. 235 The import of the 2012 Amendment was to render the 2010
Amendment inapplicable to companies like ONEOK and OGE, which
had de-staggered boards at the time that the 2010 Amendment became
effective. 236
From the perspective of ONEOK and OGE, however, it was not
enough for the legislature to act quickly in rendering the 2010
231. See 2013 House Debate, supra note 1 (quoting Rep. Scott Inman (D-Oklahoma
City) at 38:28, and noting the lobbyists and their efforts to “fix” the 2010 Amendment).
232. Id. (quoting Rep. David Dank (R-Oklahoma City) at 43:36).
233. Id. (quoting Rep. Cory Williams (D-Stillwater) at 57:09).
234. H.R. 2658, 53d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2012) (as introduced Jan. 19, 2012); see also
Bill Information for HB 2658 (2011-2012), OKLA. ST. LEGISLATURE, http://www.ok
legislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=hb2658&Session=1200 (follow “History” hyperlink)
(referencing the first reading of the bill on February 6, 2012).
235. See Bill Information for HB 2658 (2011-2012), supra note 234 (noting the bill was
approved by both the House and the Senate on February 29, 2012, and approved by the
Governor on March 1, 2012).
236. Compare S. 1132, 52d Leg., 2d Sess., §§ 105, 110 (Okla. 2010) (requiring staggered
boards for large, publicly traded corporations as of September 1, 2010), with H.R. 2658 § 1
(as enrolled Feb. 29, 2012) (returning 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1027 to a state “as if [the 2010
Amendment] was never enacted,” and exempting large publicly traded corporations from the
staggered board requirement, if the boards of such corporations were de-staggered “prior to
September 1, 2010”).
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Amendment inapplicable to them; the legislation had to become effective
quickly. This was the case because each company had an annual
meeting of shareholders looming on the horizon. 237 Under ordinary
circumstances, Oklahoma legislation takes effect ninety days after the
end of the legislative session. 238 Ninety days from the end of the
legislative session would have been late August. 239 Each of ONEOK
and OGE, however, typically held its annual meeting of shareholders in
May, 240 and each was required to distribute to shareholders information
regarding director-nominees well in advance of the actual meeting
date. 241 Consequently, under the ninety-day delayed effective date for
typical legislation, assuming that the meeting was convened in May as
usual, each of ONEOK and OGE would have been required to proceed
with its annual meeting of shareholders in compliance with the 2010
Amendment (electing only one-third of the board), even though the
legislature had enacted not-yet-effective legislation to allow ONEOK
and OGE to retain de-staggered boards. To avoid such delayed
effectiveness, and to act in a manner consistent with the preferences of
ONEOK and OGE, the legislature enacted emergency legislation, which
took effect upon signature by the governor. 242

237. See infra note 240.
238. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 58 (“No act shall take effect until ninety days after the
adjournment of the session at which it was passed, . . . unless, in case of emergency, to be
expressed in the act, the Legislature, by a vote of two-thirds of all members elected to each
House, so directs.”).
239. Id. art. V, § 26 (“[T]he regular session shall be finally adjourned sine die not later
than five o’clock p.m. on the last Friday in May of each year.”). Therefore, in 2012, the 53d
Legislative Session would have ended on May 25, 2012.
240. See, e.g., OGE Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) ii (Mar. 31, 2010)
(providing notice of annual meeting of shareholders to be convened in May 2010); ONEOK,
Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 2 (Mar. 26, 2010) (same).
241. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (2014).
242. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 58 (“No act shall take effect until ninety days after the
adjournment of the session at which it was passed, . . . unless, in case of emergency, to be
expressed in the act, the Legislature, by a vote of two-thirds of all members elected to each
House, so directs.”); H.R. 2658, 53d Leg., 2d Sess. § 2 (Okla. 2012) (as enrolled Feb. 29,
2012) (“It being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and
safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, by reason whereof this act shall take effect
and be in full force from and after its passage and approval.”).
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C. Criticisms of the 2012 Amendment
1. Criticisms of Substance
On the plus side, the 2012 Amendment lessened the impact of the
2010 Amendment, restoring de-staggered boards to those corporations
that had de-staggered their boards—consistent with the preferences of
managers and shareholders—prior to the effective date of the 2010
Amendment. Nonetheless, the 2012 Amendment amounted to specialinterest legislation, effectively drafted by two impacted corporations and
enacted at their request.
[W]e changed [the corporate code] to help one company [i.e.,
Chesapeake] . . . . And then we changed it one other time
because a utility company felt like the needs of their
stockholders were not met. 243
[W]e bailed ONEOK and OGE out . . . because, in bailing out
Aubrey [McClendon and Chesapeake in 2010], we caught up
a couple of good corporations who’ve been doing what they
were supposed to be doing. 244
The 2012 Amendment may have assuaged the concerns of the
shareholders of ONEOK and OGE, who voted to de-stagger their boards
in 2008 and 2010, respectively. 245 To the extent that the 2012
Amendment attempted to implement the agreed-upon structure of
corporate managers and corporate shareholders, however, the 2012
Amendment did not go far enough. That is, the 2012 Amendment did
nothing to quiet the concerns of Chesapeake’s shareholders. 246 The
2012 Amendment left in place the prohibition against opting out of the
staggered board until 2015. 247 Consequently, even if Chesapeake’s
board suddenly decided that it favored a de-staggered board, and its
shareholders continued to favor a de-staggered board, their preferences
could not have been implemented until 2015.

243. 2013 House Debate, supra note 1 (quoting Rep. Joe Dorman (D-Rush Springs) at
36:11).
244. Id. (quoting Rep. Cory Williams (D-Stillwater) at 58:56).
245. See supra notes 219-20, 227 and accompanying text.
246. See supra Part I.A.
247. H.R. 2658 § 1 (as enrolled Feb. 29, 2012). This on-going prohibition precipitated
another amendment to the statute in 2013. See infra Part III.
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2. Criticisms of Process
As was the case with the 2010 Amendment, the legislature amended
its corporate code without the involvement of the OK Bar Committee.
The amendments were drafted by those corporations (with assistance
from outside counsel) seeking favored treatment. Even if the legislature
did not task the Committee with drafting the bill’s language, members of
the legislature could have consulted with the Committee for its reaction
to the bill. This the legislature did not do.
Though the legislature did not consult the OK Bar Committee
regarding the 2012 Amendment, it did consult Chesapeake. Keenly
aware of Chesapeake’s legislative influence, ONEOK and OGE ensured
that Chesapeake—the intended beneficiary of the 2010 Amendment—
would not object to the 2012 Amendment.
Because the 2012
Amendment would not impact Chesapeake, Chesapeake had no
objection. 248
III. The 2013 Amendment
A. Events Leading to the 2013 Amendment
Legislators intended the 2010 Amendment to benefit Chesapeake by
requiring it to have a staggered board—an anti-takeover defense—
notwithstanding its shareholders’ preference for a de-staggered board. 249
Nonetheless, a staggered board does not leave a corporation takeoverproof. 250
In the weeks following the legislature’s adoption of the 2012
Amendment, some troubling details regarding Chesapeake and its
248. Cf. Romano, supra note 11, at 124 (“Before actively promoting Aetna’s takeover
bill with [Connecticut] legislators, the [Connecticut lobby] consulted some of its other
members concerning the merits of the draft legislation. There were no objections. There is a
straightforward explanation for this consensus: . . . most would be untouched by the
proposal.”).
249. Daniel Gilbert, Ryan Dezember & Vipal Monga, Chesapeake Board Revamp Curbs
McClendon’s Power, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2012, at B1 (noting Chesapeake described the
staggered board “structure as an ‘essential anti-takeover defense’”).
250. If a corporate has a staggered board with three classes of directors, then an acquirer
could seize control of the board (and the corporation) by launching successful proxy contests
in two successive years. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. In contrast, if a
corporation has a non-staggered board, then an acquirer could gain control by launching a
successful proxy contest in one year. See supra note 17. Thus, a staggered board imposes
additional costs and delays on an acquirer’s quest for control, but a staggered board does not
leave a corporation takeover-proof.
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management emerged. 251 This new information, coupled with prior
managerial shortcomings 252 and a falling stock price, 253 presented
problems for the company as it headed toward its annual meeting of
shareholders in June 2012. 254
1. Chesapeake’s General Oversight
When founders invite the public to invest in the stock of a
corporation, the investing public expects the corporate board to link
executives’ compensation to the corporation’s performance, to provide
some level of monitoring of the corporation and its executives, and to
provide a check on management’s self-interested behavior. 255
Chesapeake’s board provided less than stellar service in those regards.
Some of its shortcomings were already known to the market. Recall in
2009, when McClendon was forced to liquidate 94% of his holdings of
Chesapeake stock, the board lowered the minimum equity investment
requirement for its CEO, 256 paid him exceedingly generous
compensation—notwithstanding the company’s poor performance—and
agreed to purchase his private map collection for twelve million
dollars. 257
251. Bussey, supra note 32 (referencing “a gusher of revelations about Mr. McClendon’s
personal business dealings[,] . . . a raft of shareholder complaints, Wall Street downgrades,
threats of litigation, inquiries from regulators, and bad corporate earnings”).
252. See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
253. Chesapeake Energy Corporation, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com
(search “Quote Lookup” for “CHK”; then follow “Historic Prices” hyperlink; then enter
“Mar. 20, 2012” for “Start Date”; then enter “May 17, 2012” for “End Date”; then select
“Daily” for “Set Date Range”; then select “Get Prices”) (reflecting a closing price of $25.58
on March 20, 2012 and a closing price of $13.55 on may 17, 2012).
254. See Chesapeake Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 7 (May 11, 2012)
(noticing annual meeting of shareholders to be held on June 8, 2012).
255. Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Silicon Valley, Chieftains Rule with Few Checks and
Balances, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/in-siliconvalley-chieftains-rule-with-few-checks-and-balances/ (contrasting the corporate norm of
today with the corporate norm from the 1970s, as well as the corporate norm of today’s
technology companies). “[B]oards are expected to be actively involved in supervising
executives and participating in major decisions affecting the company.” Id.
256. Minow, supra note 33 (“[T]he board allowed [McClendon] to amend his
employment agreement to reduce his required equity ownership when he had a margin
call.”).
257. Id. (contrasting McClendon’s performance (one of the highest paid CEOs of the year)
with Chesapeake’s performance (40% drop in share price for the year)). Relatedly, until 2011,
the board had not tied the CEO’s compensation to the company’s performance. Russell Gold,
Board Turns on Chesapeake’s CEO: Directors Target Investment Perk; SEC Opens Informal
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Those missteps by the board, in addition to matters described
below, 258 which seemingly benefitted McClendon at the expense of
Chesapeake’s shareholders, led some to believe that McClendon
“handpicked” the board, which then simply “rubberstamped” his
preferred courses of action. 259 Because McClendon served as both
Chairman of the Board and CEO 260—contrary to the preference of some
corporate-governance mavens—one means of oversight (an independent
chairman) was unavailable to Chesapeake. 261 The generous
compensation that board members received even invited some
suggestion that the board was paid not to meddle in how McClendon ran
the company. 262
Probe, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2012, at B1 [hereinafter Gold, Board Turns] (stating McClendon
“resisted performance-based pay measures until he faced a shareholder revolt” in 2011); Daniel
Gilbert, Chesapeake CEO Faces Storm, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702304778304576375743181597036 (“Unlike many executives
in the country, Mr. McClendon’s compensation [wa]s set solely at the nine-member board’s
discretion and ha[d]n’t been tied to stated performance standards [until 2011].”).
258. See infra Part III.A.2-6.
259. Gold, supra note 29 (“[McClendon] has run the company largely by his own rules
since he co-founded it in 1989.”); Christopher Helman, The Two Sides of Aubrey McClendon,
America’s Most Reckless Billionaire, FORBES (Oct. 5, 2011, 5:17 PM), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/christopherhelman/2011/10/05/aubrey-mcclendon-chesapeake-billionaire-wildcattershale/; Ernest Scheyder & Brian Grow, SEC Starts Probe of Chesapeake CEO’s Well Stakes,
REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2012, 7:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/26/us-chesapeakeidUSBRE83P0PX20120426 (“Critics of [Chesapeake] have long complained the company’s
board acted a[s] little more than a rubber stamp for McClendon . . . .”).
260. See Russell Gold, Chesapeake Board Crimps CEO’s Power, WALL ST. J., May 1,
2012, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304050304577377781801653726
[hereinafter Gold, Board Crimps CEO’s Power].
261. “A cozy sense of entitlement is a tendency that separating the jobs [of CEO and
Chairman] is intended to combat . . . .” Jeff Sommer, The C.E.O. Triumphant (at Least at
Apple and Chase), N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/26/yourmoney/at-apple-and-jpmorgan-a-good-week-for-the-ceo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (citing
Erik Gordon, a professor of law and business at the University of Michigan); id. (contrasting
the typical preference of corporate governance experts of separating the positions of
Chairman and CEO with a recent vote by shareholders of JP Morgan Chase opposing the
separation of Chairman and CEO, positions held by Jamie Dimon, but noting his relative
success during the mortgage crisis and that seven of the ten largest institutional shareholders
of the company are run by individuals that hold both positions).
262. Jeff Goodell, The Big Fracking Bubble: The Scam Behind Aubrey McClendon’s
Gas Boom, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/thebig-fracking-bubble-the-scam-behind-the-gas-boom-20120301. In fact, the board members
were compensated generously and significantly higher than board members at peer
companies. Gilbert, supra note 257 (“Directors’ pay for 2010 averaged above half a million
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2. Chesapeake’s Aggressiveness and the Incurrence of Debt
When the market for natural gas was flourishing, McClendon’s
aggressiveness served Chesapeake and its shareholders well. 263
McClendon, however, remained aggressive despite changing market
conditions. 264 Between 2006 and 2011, Chesapeake “aggressively
acquired leases in natural gas shale plays . . . and unconventional oil
plays . . . .” 265 Quite simply, Chesapeake was spending billions more
than its operations produced. 266 According to plans announced in early
dollars . . . . Both ISS and Glass Lewis say that [Chesapeake] director compensation is
significantly higher than at peer companies.”); Daniel Gilbert & Joann S. Lublin,
Chesapeake Draws Shareholder Ire, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news
/articles/SB10001424052702304331204577354381117840896 (“In addition, Chesapeake
board members are allowed up to 40 hours of flight time on company leased aircraft every
year. Only 2% of S&P 500 companies let their board members use corporate aircraft for
personal purposes . . . .”); Mark Maremont & Daniel Gilbert, Chesapeake’s Private Jets In
Cross Hairs, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240
52702304363104577392542273995870 (stating that Chesapeake “owns fractional shares in
22 different jets [, which] . . . is a large number given” the company’s size, and that, for
2011, Chesapeake expended $2.9 million for management’s personal air travel, which is
significantly more than its regional competitors–Anadarko Petroleum Corp. ($633,000) and
Devon Energy Corp. ($98,000)). Shortly before the 2012 annual meeting of shareholders, the
board’s compensation was dramatically reduced and the aircraft perquisite was eliminated.
Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Exhibit 99.1 (May 31, 2012) (stating
Chesapeake “[r]educ[ed] directors’ annual compensation by 20%, to a level that is at or
below that of the Company’s peers”); see also Daniel Gilbert, Chesapeake Energy Probe of
McClendon Drags into 2013, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424127887323635504578211433215730800 (stating Chesapeake “eliminated a perk
that allowed directors to use company aircraft for personal travel”).
263. “It was . . . a period in which Chesapeake—with Mr. McClendon as the leader, chief
promoter and visionary-in-chief—helped jump-start a revolutionary change in the U.S.
energy landscape.” Gold, Board Crimps CEO’s Power, supra note 260 (“While . . . there
was a land rush to gobble up the acreage, Chesapeake was a Wall Street darling.”).
264. Helman, supra note 259 (“[McClendon is] the most reckless, the alpha wildcatter
with an off-the-charts risk tolerance.”).
265. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 2 (Mar. 1, 2013).
266. Daniel Gilbert, Chesapeake Faces Costly Cuts, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303296604577452820329167592; Gilbert
et al., supra note 249 (citing Chesapeake’s announcement that “it would spend as much as
$9.6 billion [in 2012], despite projecting less than $3 billion in cash flow, and recently
borrowed $4 billion”); see also Liam Denning, Chesapeake’s Working-Capital Conundrum,
WALL ST. J., June 1, 2012, at C10 (charting, since 2003, Chesapeake’s mostly negative
working capital and its peers’ mostly positive working capital). Net working capital is a
company’s current assets minus its current liabilities, or a measure of a “company’s
efficiency and short-term liquidity.” Id.
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2012, Chesapeake sought to “raise as much as $14 billion dollars . . . in
financial transactions—more than quadruple what it expect[ed] to
generate by selling oil and gas . . . .” 267 For perspective, Chesapeake
needed to raise an amount of money that exceeded the amount at which
the market valued the company. 268 Despite issuing stock at a rate much
higher than its peers, Chesapeake could not cover its expenses and
incurred significant debt. 269 As concerns of default increased, creditrating agencies downgraded Chesapeake, 270 and the company repeatedly
borrowed on unfavorable terms. 271 Additionally, in hopes of evading
those unfavorable terms, Chesapeake resorted to “an exotic menu of
267. Dezember & Gilbert, supra note 45.
268. Liam Denning, Chesapeake Fuels Reputation for Risk, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303425504577352113862801738 (comparing
Chesapeake’s then-market capitalization of $12.7 billion market capitalization with its “offbalance sheet obligations of [an estimated] $6 billion . . . on top of existing net debt of $10.3
billion.”); see also Liam Denning, Drilling into Chesapeake’s Balance Sheet, WALL ST. J., May
2, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303877604577380122256
628742?mod=_newsreel_4 (comparing Chesapeake’s then-market capitalization of
approximately $11 billion with its $15 billion financing plans).
269. Helman, supra note 259 (noting McClendon “expand[ed] shares outstanding by an
average 12% a year versus 2% for the industry[, but it was] . . . still not enough, and the
difference [came] from borrowing—Chesapeake’s debt-to-capital ratio of 40% [was] the
highest in its peer group”).
270. Gold, Board Turns, supra note 257 (“[D]ebt-rating agency Standard & Poor’s lowered
Chesapeake’s ratings to two notches below investment grade because of concerns about the
company’s corporate governance and Mr. McClendon’s activities.”); Jonathan Fahey,
Chesapeake to End CEO Investment Program, YAHOO! FINANCE (Apr. 26, 2012),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/chesapeake-end-ceo-investment-program-130658910.html (stating
“[t]he bond rating agency Fitch lowered its outlook on Chesapeake’s debt,” citing low natural gas
prices and potential difficulties the company might have raising money because of the
uncertainties around McClendon’s loan deals).
271. Gilbert et al., supra note 249 (noting that Chesapeake borrowed $4 billion through a
high-cost loan to improve its liquidity); Angel Gonzalez & Matt Wirz, Chesapeake Energy
Increases Loan Sale to $4 Billion, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304192704577406631428253866 (evidencing Chesapeake’s weakened
financial ability and increased risk of default by noting the increasing rate of interest that it
was required to pay on the $4 billion debt, 8.5% through 2012, and 11% thereafter); Matt
Wirz & Daniel Gilbert, Chesapeake Bank Loan Jars Bond Investors, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304192704577403962652915598
(noting
“[c]oncerns about the possibility of default” increased); Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report
(Form 8-K) Exhibit 99.1 (May 17, 2012) (describing the $4 billion debt); see also Dezember &
Gilbert, supra note 45 (noting that, in 2010, Chesapeake issued $1 billion in senior notes and paid
only 6.13% in interest, but in 2011, when it issued $1.3 billion in senior notes, it had to pay 6.78%
in interest).
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financial stratagems” of a sort that none of its peers practiced, which
invited market scrutiny and skepticism. 272 In retrospect, the board
probably should have tempered McClendon’s aggressiveness. 273 Given
that this aggressiveness previously contributed to the company’s
success, perhaps Chesapeake was just “unlucky.” 274 Nonetheless, “by
continuing to spend profligately, reducing its flexibility to deal with
[market and industry] vagaries . . . , Chesapeake ma[de] its own luck.” 275
3. Chesapeake’s Corporate Mission
Corporations generally are free to seek profit by any legal means. 276
Although corporations may pursue different missions as they evolve
over time, a corporation commonly identifies its core competencies and
then seeks profits based upon those competencies for which it possesses
a competitive advantage. 277 A lack of corporate focus reflects poorly on
corporate management. Chesapeake’s overly aggressive focus on
acquiring leasehold interests resulted in a burgeoning debt load, forcing
Chesapeake to deviate from its one-time focus and undertake an array of
profit-seeking activities.
For much of its existence, Chesapeake focused on locating and
developing natural gas fields. 278 As the price of natural gas fell, so did
272. See Daniel Gilbert, Corporate News: Chesapeake Boosts Cash Goal, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 14, 2012, at B3; Goodell, supra note 262 (quoting Bob Brackett, a financial analyst:
“‘Chesapeake’s poor credit rating pushes them to turn to unconventional financing.’”);
Helman, supra note 259 (noting none of Chesapeake’s peers “engage in such odd
financing”).
273. See Gold, Board Crimps CEO’s Power, supra note 260 (“[A]s natural-gas prices
have dropped, investors have valued financial discipline over growth, and Chesapeake has
faltered.”).
274. Id.; Denning, supra note 268
275. Id.
276. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2011) (requiring the certificate of
incorporation to set forth the “nature of the business or purposes to be conducted [but that i]t
shall be sufficient to state . . . that the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful
act . . .”); 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1006(a)(3) (2011) (same).
277. MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING
SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE (1985). For example, over time, Apple has morphed from a
producer of desktop computers to a producer of portable hand-held devices, but all the while
the company focused upon its innovative technologies and its knowledge of consumer
preferences. See Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 30 (Oct. 31, 2012) (reflecting
annual sales of $6.04 billion for desktop computers, $5.62 billion for iPods, $80.45 billion
for iPhones, and $32.42 billion for iPads).
278. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 3 (Mar. 1, 2011) (“From
2000 through 2008, our focus was on finding and developing natural gas resource plays.”).
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Chesapeake’s profits—forcing it to seek other means of profit
generation. For example, although Chesapeake had not previously
focused on oil, the corporation turned to oil as the differential between
the price of oil and natural gas widened. 279 For 2012, its oil sales
outpaced its natural gas sales. 280 Chesapeake’s increased emphasis on
oil could not, however, advance unimpeded, because the company had to
sell some of its most valued holdings to pay down outstanding debt. 281
Of course, with the price of natural gas falling, its natural gas holdings
would not have drawn an attractive price, so Chesapeake perversely had
to sell its oil holdings while trying to expand into that field. 282
In addition, to pay down debt, Chesapeake sold some of its pipeline
assets, undermining its business strategy of vertical integration. 283
Although, in the short term, those pipeline sales generated revenue,
those sales translated to future debt, as Chesapeake eventually will have
to pay the new owner of the pipelines to transport its own natural gas. 284
“Chesapeake’s [hedging] plays in the market resemble[d] the
approach of a hedge fund more so than an exploration company . . . .” 285
In the company’s own words, “‘[W]e . . . hedge to make money.’” 286
Knowing that the price of oil and gas is beyond their control, oil and gas
279. Clifford Krauss, Trouble with the Top Man, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2012, http://
mobile.nytimes.com/2012/04/27/business/energy-environment/chesapeake-energy-to-end-chiefscompensation-plan.html?_r=0 (stating Chesapeake “has [recently] tried to move more of its
drilling into oil, since prices for crude are still high”); Chesapeake Energy Corp., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) 3 (Mar. 1, 2011) (“In the past two years, our focus has shifted to finding and
developing plays with oil and natural gas liquids (NGL) since oil and NGLs are more highly
valued in the U.S. than natural gas . . . .”).
280. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6 (Mar. 1, 2013) (reflecting
increasing oil sales: $822 million for 2010, $1.52 billion for 2011, and $2.83 billion for
2012; and decreasing natural gas sales: $3.169 billion for 2010, $3.13 billion for 2011, and
$2.00 billion for 2012 (all totals are exclusive of derivatives)).
281. Krauss, supra note 279 (“But in an indication of Chesapeake’s weakening condition,
Mr. McClendon is poised to sell its 1.5 million acres in the West Texas Permian basin, one
of the hottest drilling spots in the country.”); Gilbert, supra note 272 (quoting criticism by
Mark Hanson, an analyst at Morningstar: “You don’t just acquire [the Permian Basin asset in
October 2011], flip it [in February 2012]”).
282. See Krauss, supra note 279.
283. See Chesapeake Energy Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 3–4 (Mar. 1, 2011)
(discussing a “business strategy” that includes “vertical integration”).
284. Liam Denning, Chesapeake Energy Pays the Piper, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2012, at
B16.
285. Russell Gold, Hedges Gone Awry Set Back Chesapeake, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2012,
at B1.
286. Id.
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companies commonly enter contracts to minimize, or hedge, their
risk. 287 Oil and gas companies typically “lock in prices for a year or two
so [they] can concentrate on finding and producing oil and natural gas.
Chesapeake, in contrast, [wa]s an active trader in the commodities
markets, buying and selling financial contracts on exchanges . . . for
short-term gains—or losses.” 288 Like similarly situated companies,
Chesapeake entered into contracts to hedge risk, but it sold a number of
those protective contracts in the fall of 2011. 289 These sales yielded
$353 million in profit, but Chesapeake eventually suffered losses of
more than $750 million during late 2011 and early 2012, when it had to
sell natural gas at market prices that had fallen to decade-low levels. 290
Such hedging losses were significant given that, for the first quarter of
2012, 291 Chesapeake posted a gain from operations of only six million
dollars. 292
Chesapeake earned profits, “not from selling the gas itself, but from
buying and flipping the land that contain[ed] the gas. [In 2012, t]he
company [was] the largest leaseholder in the United States, owning the
drilling rights to some 15 million acres—an area more than twice the
size of Maryland,” 293 but it would have taken the company thirty years
to drill the leases that it had acquired. 294 Its aggressive acquisitions
were met with a cratering market for natural gas, as unaffordable lease
fees accumulated. 295 In addition to billions due in lease payments, the
terms of certain leases forced Chesapeake to drill at a loss on some
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See infra Part III.A.4 (suggesting that Chesapeake may disguise its hedging gains
and losses as “operational” gains and losses).
292. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 5 (May 11, 2012).
293. Goodell, supra note 262.
294. Helman, supra note 259 (“[During 2007-2011,] Chesapeake . . . entered into
600,000 leases covering 9 million acres, paying out $9 billion in lease bonuses to
landowners in the process—so much land that it would take Chesapeake 30 years to drill it
all.”).
295. See Daniel Gilbert, Joann S. Lublin & Russell Gold, Chesapeake Overhauls Board,
WALL ST. J., June 21, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230489870457
7480352163444694 (stating Chesapeake is “saddled . . . with debt and . . . vulnerable to
sinking prices for its principal product”); Russell Gold, Costly Liabilities Lurk for Gas
Giant, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2012, at A1 (noting that Chesapeake “continued to spend
billions to lease new acreage and drill new wells, leaving it with a projected gap of $10
billion between operational cash flow and its spending and debt-reduction plans”).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss2/1

2015]

OKLAHOMA’S CORPORATE LAW AMENDMENTS

273

properties because those leases specified dates by which the company
was required to drill to avoid losing its rights to do so. 296 Consequently,
Chesapeake began selling the leaseholds that it had aggressively
acquired. 297 This leasehold-transaction business “amount[ed] to a
shadow company within Chesapeake, [costing] some $6.5 billion in cash
a year . . . and [generating] $5 billion in proceeds[, or] . . . almost as
much cash in and cash out as the supposedly core oil and gas
business.” 298
4. Chesapeake’s Financial Statements and Their Transparency
Because one cannot take a corporation for a test drive to assess its
value, the market heavily relies upon corporate disclosure, particularly a
corporation’s financial statements, to assess a company’s worth. 299
Chesapeake appears to have been less than transparent in its financial
statements, 300 as the corporation reportedly understated its debt and
obscured its earnings from operations.
296. Gilbert, supra note 266 (noting payment of $20 billion in connection with leases
entered into between 2008 and 2012, which leases required drilling at a loss (due to the
falling price of natural gas) or risk losing the lease); Goodell, supra note 262 (describing the
leases as including a hidden cost–the obligation to drill by specified dates); Helman, supra
note 259 (describing Chesapeake drilling “at a breakneck pace in [Louisiana and Texas],
even at a loss”).
297. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 3 (Mar. 1, 2010) (“[W]e
have shifted our strategy from drilling inventory capture to drilling inventory conversion and
monetization. In doing so, we have de-emphasized acquisitions of proved properties, . . .
capturing value by selling a portion of our leasehold and producing properties.”); Gilbert et
al., supra note 249. Following the change of control in 2012, Chesapeake planned
divestitures, more so than acquisitions. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Annual Report (Form 10K) 2-3 (Mar. 1, 2013) (“[W]e aggressively acquired leases in natural gas shale plays from
2006 through 2008 and unconventional oil plays from 2009 through 2011. . . . We believe
this extensive leasehold position . . . offers valuable divestiture opportunities . . . . Our
undeveloped leasehold acquisition phase in now substantially complete.”).
298. Helman, supra note 259. The leasehold transactions were not clearly reflected in the
company’s income statement. Id. For more on the lack of transparency, see infra Part
III.A.4.
299. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 578-80
(7th ed. 2013).
300. A corporation’s disclosures may be less than transparent to further its interests and
those of its investors. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 290–93, 310–11 (1991). For example, a company may not
be forthcoming about a new discovery or innovation because disclosure might advantage its
competitors more than its own investors. Id. However, this does not appear to have been the
case for Chesapeake regarding the disclosures that will be discussed in this section.
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As discussed above, as Chesapeake became increasing indebted, the
terms at which it borrowed became increasingly unfavorable. 301
Chesapeake consequently resorted to unconventional financing
transactions, for which its balance sheets did not reflect obligations of
more than one billion dollars. 302
Chesapeake obscured its earnings from operations by treating
seemingly nonoperational income as operational income. Utilizing
permissible—but atypical—accounting methods, Chesapeake mixed
proceeds from assets sales with operational revenue. 303 Financial
analysts generally treat assets sales by an exploration and production
company as one-time gains or losses and would exclude such items from
a company’s operational profitability. 304 Chesapeake, on the other hand,
offset its operational expenses in 2011 by nine billion dollars from
assets sales and similarly treated transactions, leaving unclear the
efficiency of its operations. 305 Just as Chesapeake may have been
overinclusive regarding its operational earnings, it may have been
underinclusive regarding its operational expenses. 306 Even if the lack of
301. See supra Part III.A.2.
302. Gold, supra note 295 (noting that Chesapeake “made a number of long-term
commitments to Wall Street banks that require it to deliver specific amounts of oil and
natural gas each month through 2022, in exchange for upfront cash . . . . [Chesapeake] told
investors how much the unusual deals . . . brought in for the company . . . [, b]ut it ha[d]n’t
provided details about the costs to fulfill the contracts,” which analysts subsequently
estimated to be $300 million in 2012, $270 million in 2013, and $800 million between 2014
and 2022); see also Denning, supra note 268 (noting that Chesapeake incurred “off-balance
sheet obligations of [an estimated] $6 billion”); Gilbert, supra note 272 (“[Chesapeake sold]
future oil and gas production from a field in the Texas Panhandle for cash up front, the 10th
such deal it has done [between] 2007 [and February 2012]. . . . Some analysts are unnerved
by this manner of raising cash, which they say creates obligations that don’t show up on the
company’s balance sheet.”); Helman, supra note 259 (noting that credit rating agencies
consider the volumetric-production-payment transactions to be off-balance-sheet debt where
“loans [are] to be repaid in gas instead of cash”).
303. Ben Casselman, Critics: Chesapeake’s Murky Books Obscure Costs, WALL ST. J.,
May 20, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230479170457741648307
0025516; see also Helman, supra note 259 (“The land business amount[ed] to a shadow
company within Chesapeake . . . . But you wouldn’t know it from the income statement. No
land acquisitions or sales show up there.”).
304. Casselman, supra note 303.
305. Id.
306. Id. (“Chesapeake . . . accounts for its exploration and drilling expenses using a
method that accounting experts say is generally more aggressive and less transparent than
the approach many other big energy companies use. . . mak[ing] it hard to figure out the true
costs of Chesapeake’s drilling programs and their success . . . . For example, the company
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transparency in its financial statements never rose to the level of fraud,
Chesapeake, by obscuring its financial condition, invited skepticism and
discounted valuations. 307
5. Chesapeake’s Conflicts of Interest
A corporate executive’s personal finances generally would not be a
matter of concern to the board of directors. In the case of Aubrey
McClendon, however, Chesapeake’s board should have been more
aware of transactions giving rise to potential conflicts of interest. When
McClendon personally risked his investment in Chesapeake, resulting in
his sale of millions of shares of Chesapeake stock in 2008, the board
learned that McClendon’s penchant for risk in his personal finances
could negatively impact Chesapeake. 308 If not prior to 2008, then
certainly thereafter, the board should have done more to monitor
McClendon’s personal financial activities. When the transactions
described below came to light in 2012, shortly before the annual
meeting of shareholders, the market reacted negatively. 309
From 2004 to 2008, while serving in the dual roles of Chesapeake’s
Chairman and CEO, McClendon helped to run a two hundred million
dollar hedge fund. 310 During that time period, McClendon “engaged in
‘near daily’ communications and ‘exhaustive’ calls to help direct the

last year spent $776 million in interest, according to securities filings, but reported only $44
million on its income statement.”).
307. See Daniel Gilbert & Tom Fowler, Chesapeake Targets ‘Aubrey Discount’, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 30, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323926104578274
272217881136 (referencing the “Aubrey discount”); Krauss, supra note 279 (“‘When it
comes to disclosure with [McClendon], there always seems to be something amiss,
something in the picture that hasn’t come out,’ said Mark Hanson, an energy stock analyst at
Morningstar.”).
308. See supra Part I.A.
309. Chesapeake’s share price fell by 25% between the beginning of the year and the
midyear shareholder meeting, reaching a low point on May 17, 2012. Chesapeake Energy
Corp.: Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=CHK+
Historical+Prices (search “Start Date” for “Jan. 3, 2012”; then search “End Date” for “June
7, 2012”; then follow “Get Prices”) (showing Jan. 3, 2012 closing price of $23.60; May 17,
2012 closing price of $13.55; June 7, 2012 closing price of $17.85).
310. Bussey, supra note 32; Russell Gold & Daniel Gilbert, The Many Hats of Aubrey
McClendon, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2012, at B1; Schneyer et al., supra note 27. Chesapeake
was, once again, less than transparent; prior to the reporting by Reuters in 2012, Chesapeake
had not publicly disclosed McClendon’s involvement in the hedge fund. Schneyer et al.,
supra note 27.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

276

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:221

fund’s trading,” according to another who helped run the fund. 311
McClendon frequently met with the fund’s traders and regularly met
with potential fund investors. 312 McClendon cofounded the fund, which
listed Chesapeake as its mailing address, and its listed phone number
was answered “Chesapeake Energy” by one who was unfamiliar with the
fund. 313 If the distraction from simultaneously managing significant
companies was not troubling in and of itself, 314 then the fact that
McClendon’s hedge fund traded in the commodities that Chesapeake
generated, which created the potential for self-interested trades, should
have been. 315 Unlike trading in stocks, insider trading in commodities is
not illegal, absent manipulation. 316 Nonetheless, in contrast to
Chesapeake’s practices, 317 oil and gas companies generally prohibit such
trading. 318 Because Chesapeake accounted for 5% of natural gas
production, a public announcement by Chesapeake regarding natural gas
could move the market, presenting an opportunity for McClendon’s
hedge fund to trade profitably ahead of that announcement. 319
Additionally, at some point, it may have been in Chesapeake’s best
interests to take a particular action regarding natural gas that would have
decreased the value of a position held by McClendon’s hedge fund,
presenting the risk that McClendon would not have caused Chesapeake
to take that action. 320

311. Schneyer et al., supra note 27.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. McClendon had other wide-ranging investment interests, but there has been no
indication that he played a significant managerial role in those other investments. See Gold
& Gilbert, supra note 310 (listing ownership stakes in a television station, Jamba Juice Co.,
the Oklahoma City Thunder, a cattle ranch, and a cancer-treatment center).
315. Schneyer et al., supra note 27.
316. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2012).
317. Neither Chesapeake nor McClendon responded to requests for information on the
issue; Chesapeake’s Code of Ethics did not clearly address the issue. Schneyer et al., supra
note 27.
318. Maria Lokshin, SEC Examining Insider Trading Rules For Commodities Markets,
White Says, 45 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1429, 1429 (2013); Schneyer et al., supra note 27.
319. Schneyer et al., supra note 27 (describing “front-running”). Reuters listed an
example of Chesapeake’s market-moving actions: “On January 23, the company announced
sharp output curbs in response to low prices. In response, U.S. natural gas futures surged by
8 percent the same day.” Id.
320. Id.
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6. Chesapeake’s FWPP
Chesapeake provided McClendon with a virtually unique opportunity
to personally profit on each well the company drilled. 321 Under the
Founder Well Participation Program (FWPP) that shareholders approved
in 2005, 322 McClendon was entitled to buy a 2.5% stake in each well
drilled by Chesapeake, but it was all-or-none to prevent cherry picking
by the CEO. 323 In theory, the FWPP could align McClendon’s personal
interests with the interests of Chesapeake’s shareholders. Regarding the
FWPP, however, the alignment of McClendon’s personal interests with
those of Chesapeake’s shareholders was jeopardized in various regards,
some of which are addressed here. 324
First, following the margin call, McClendon’s personal holdings of
Chesapeake stock fell below 1%, while his personal interest in
Chesapeake’s wells remained at 2.5%. 325 By percentage interests alone,
McClendon faced greater incentives to ensure the profitable operation of
Chesapeake’s wells than of Chesapeake as a whole.
Second, if the terms of the FWPP properly motivated McClendon,
then those terms should have been firm when, in effect, they were not.
321. Russell Gold, Tough Talks Loom at Chesapeake, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2012, http://
online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303990604577370343158069850. The program
was not unique because SandRidge Energy, Inc. (SandRidge) also permitted its founder,
Tom Ward, to participate in a similar program. Id. Interestingly, Ward and McClendon
cofounded Chesapeake in 1989, before Ward left Chesapeake and organized SandRidge. Id.;
David Wethe & Joe Carrol, Chesapeake Co-Founder Ward Funding New Energy-Production
Company, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 17, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-17/chesa
peake-co-founder-ward-funding-new-energy-production-company.html. SandRidge, however,
terminated its well-participation program in 2008. Gold, supra. Although SandRidge had
permitted Ward a 3% stake in each well (compared to McClendon’s 2.5% under Chesapeake’s
program), Ward’s aggregate stakes were one-tenth the size of McClendon’s aggregate stakes.
Id.
322. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 13-14 (Apr. 29, 2005)
(submitting the continuation of the FWPP to shareholders for approval in 2005, but noting
that the program had been in force since the company’s initial public offering in 1993);
Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Exhibit 10.2.1 (June 15, 2005)
(same).
323. Gold, supra note 295; Driver & Grow, supra note 29.
324. An extensive analysis of the FWPP exceeds the scope of the article.
325. Christopher Helman, It’s High Time Chesapeake’s McClendon Felt the Heat,
FORBES (June 10, 2011, 12:12 PM), http://onforb.es/tfL7qt (noting that McClendon’s well
interests, not his shares in Chesapeake, allowed him “to stay on the Forbes 400 list of richest
Americans. These interests also give McClendon enormous incentive to make deals to sell
Chesapeake’s developed acreage to other buyers”).
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With respect to some wells, McClendon sold his personal interests, 326
partially severing the link between his personal interests and those of
Chesapeake and its shareholders. 327
Third, a contract that specifies a percentage of the whole, without
providing for the possibility that the whole may deviate substantially in
size, may be poorly crafted. 328 During the FWPP’s first full year, the
year following shareholder approval of the FWPP, Chesapeake drilled
only nineteen wells. 329 Due in part to Chesapeake’s aggressive
acquisition of leasehold interests, Chesapeake eventually drilled more
oil and gas wells per year than any other company, 330 drilling as many as
1700 wells in 2011. 331 To meet the all-or-nothing requirement of the
FWPP, McClendon had to bear his share of the increasingly large costs
of operating so many wells. For example, in 2011, he had to pony up
$457 million. 332 During 2012, it became public that McClendon had
borrowed over one billion dollars to continue his participation in the
FWPP, which was troubling in certain regards. 333 McClendon pledged
his interests in the wells as collateral until the loans were repaid, 334
potentially de-linking his personal interests from the interests of
Chesapeake and its shareholders. 335 Moreover, McClendon caused
Chesapeake to transact with companies to which he was personally

326. Gold, Board Turns, supra note 257 (“In 2008, he sold off future production from his
minority stakes in several thousand wells to . . . Wells Fargo & Co. He was paid $132.45
million in 2008 under the deal and agreed to provide oil and gas from the wells for a 10-year
period.”).
327. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 421, 422(b)(5) (2012) (providing favorable tax treatment by
a corporation of its grants of stock options, which corporations commonly utilize to align the
interests of their executives with the interests of their shareholders, but only when any “such
option by its terms is not transferable by such individual”).
328. See generally Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 729–33 (7th Cir. 2008)
(Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 559 U.S. 335 (2010).
329. Gold, Board Crimps CEO’s Power, supra note 260.
330. Gold & Gilbert, supra note 310; see also Gold, Board Turns, supra note 257 (stating
Chesapeake had become the “most active driller in the nation”).
331. Gold & Gilbert, supra note 310.
332. Id. (“At the end of [2011], his ownership stake made him the 25th largest oil-andnatural-gas producer in the U.S. To fund this, he needed to raise $457 million in 2011
alone.”); see also Gold, Board Crimps CEO’s Power, supra note 260; Gold, supra note 321.
333. Bussey, supra note 32; Driver & Grow, supra note 29; Gold, Board Crimps CEO’s
Power, supra note 260.
334. Gold, Board Turns, supra note 257; Gold, supra note 321.
335. Driver & Grow, supra note 29.
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indebted, presenting potentially stark conflicts of interests.
McClendon’s largest lender, EIG, “received favorable terms on its
Chesapeake investments.” 336
In one instance, he arranged for [personal] loans of up to $1.4
billion from private-equity group EIG . . . while Chesapeake
was negotiating to sell it hundreds of millions of dollars in
corporate assets . . . . In other cases, Wells Fargo & Co. and
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. made [personal] loans [to
McClendon before] . . . Chesapeake selected these companies
to act as financial advisers and handle [another transaction]. 337
Fourth, McClendon’s personal indebtedness resulted in a different
type of conflict between his personal interests and those of
Chesapeake’s shareholders. McClendon may have been unable or
unwilling to continually increase his personal borrowing to participate in
the FWPP, whereas risk-averse shareholders of a corporation want the
corporation to increase debt to pursue promising long-term strategies. 338
Though certainly not the only explanation, this short-term/long-term
conflict suggests a rationale that explains Chesapeake’s “shadow” land
business. 339 By causing Chesapeake to acquire valuable leasehold
interests, prove their worth by drilling, and then sell those interests,
336. Id.
337. Gold, Board Crimps CEO’s Power, supra note 260; see also Joe Carroll, Chesapeake
Board Backtracks on What It Knew on CEO Loans, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 26, 2012, 3:43 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-26/chesapeake-board-back tracks-on-what-it-knewabout-ceo-loans-2-.html (“McClendon got a $1 billion line of credit with EIG Management Co.
LLC . . . . EIG Management is a unit of EIG Global Energy Partners LLC, which participated
in a $1.2 billion preferred-shares purchase in the Chesapeake subsidiary on April 9.”); Gold,
Board Turns, supra note 257 (“In recent years, [McClendon] has taken two loans that are
controlled by EIG . . . . In the last six months, EIG has participated in groups that have
purchased about $2.5 billion in Chesapeake assets.”); Gold, supra note 295 (referencing that
Wells Fargo had participated in one of Chesapeake’s VPP programs); Gold, supra note 321
(discussing the transactions between EIG and McClendon and EIG and Chesapeake).
338. See, e.g., N.J. Carpenters Pension Fund v. Infogroup, Inc., No. Civ.A. 5334-VCN,
2011 WL 4825888, at *8-10 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011) (finding it reasonable to infer that the
company’s founder and significant shareholder acted in self-interest when he had a
significant liquidity need and caused the corporation to engage in a transaction, because
minority shareholders–unlike the founder–could easily liquidate their small positions, so the
founder’s liquidity need was unique among shareholders); CHOPER ET AL., supra note 36, at
210-12 (describing shareholders appropriating wealth from debtholders by increasing the
riskiness of the corporation).
339. Helman, supra note 259.
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McClendon would limit his personal costs under the FWPP to the shortterm, but Chesapeake’s sales would allow McClendon to collect his
share of discounted, long-term profits. The potential conflict would
arise from the differing needs to limit costs; McClendon might have
been unable or unwilling to continue to borrow, but Chesapeake’s
shareholders might have preferred that the company continue to exploit,
rather than sell, productive land, and bear the costs of doing so.
Failing to perform “basic due diligence,” 340 Chesapeake’s board “did
not review, approve or have knowledge of the specific transactions
engaged in by Mr. McClendon [to finance his participation in the
FWPP] or the terms of those transactions.” 341 After learning that
McClendon was personally indebted to companies that had transacted
with Chesapeake, the board stripped McClendon of his chairmanship on
May 1, 2012, approximately five weeks before the annual meeting of
shareholders. 342 By agreement, the FWPP was terminated. 343
340. Scheyder & Daily, supra note 259 (quoting Jake Dollarhide, CEO of Longbow
Asset Management, Tulsa, OK); id. (allowing McClendon “free rei[gn]”).
341. Krauss, supra note 279; see also Nathan Koppel, Chesapeake Backtracks on What
Board Knew of CEO’s Transactions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052702303990604577368382228834906 (noting that, after stating that
board was “fully aware” of the transactions whereby McClendon financed his FWPP costs,
board clarified that it was unaware of particular financing transactions and only “generally
aware” that McClendon posted his stakes under the FWPP as collateral for the loans).
Chesapeake did not disclose “the number, amounts, or terms of McClendon’s loans” that
enabled his continued participation in the FWPP. Driver & Grow, supra note 29. Although
federal rules specifically require disclosure of pledges of stock by executives to secure loans,
those rules do not extend to pledges of interests in wells. Id. But see Anna Driver & Brian
Grow, Chesapeake Discloses Loans After Reuters Report, REUTERS (Apr. 20, 2012, 8:18
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/21/us-chesapeake-idUSBRE83J0QJ20120421
(“Wall Street analysts . . . said more was needed.”). The Securities and Exchange
Commission commenced an informal inquiry into the FWPP. Gold, Board Turns, supra note
257; Gold, Board Crimps CEO’s Power, supra note 260. A shareholder suit regarding the
FWPP and non-disclosures was filed on April 19, 2012 and is on-going. Mallow v.
McClendon, No. 5:12-cv-00436-M (W.D. Okla. 2012).
342. Gold & Gilbert, supra note 310; Denning, supra note 268; Daniel Gilbert, Chesapeake
CEO McClendon to Exit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424127887324329204578272353396167988 [hereinafter Gilbert, Chesapeake CEO]
(stating that McClendon cited “‘philosophical differences’ with a board of directors largely
installed by shareholders to curb his risk-taking and free-spending ways.”). The market reacted
favorably to the news. Gilbert & Fowler, supra note 307 (noting stock price increase of 6%).
McClendon’s severance agreement requires Chesapeake to pay him $50 million over four
years. Gregory Zuckerman & Daniel Gilbert, For CEOs, Buyout Game Can Be Second Act,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732336180457
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7. Chesapeake’s Board of Directors Shake-Up
The foregoing precipitated further change at Chesapeake, 344 despite
years of the company resisting change at the board level, 345 despite the
company’s staggered board, and despite the 2010 Amendment that
required companies like Chesapeake to retain their staggered boards
until 2015. 346 Icahn reappeared, disclosing in late May 2012, weeks
before Chesapeake’s annual meeting of shareholders, that he had
increased his holdings to over 7%. 347 Icahn criticized Chesapeake’s
management, pointing to the “enormous risk associated with an ever
changing business strategy, enormous capital funding gap, poor
Icahn’s position
governance, and unchecked risk taking.” 348
commanded support from others, 349 including Southeastern Asset
8386400318570598. This severance agreement includes triple the cash amount required by
contract, which prompted renewed criticism of Chesapeake’s compensation practices. Daniel
Gilbert, Proxy Advisers Again Take Aim at Chesapeake, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2013, http://
online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324299104578527691959222894?mg=reno64_
wsj.
Following an inquiry by the board of directors, Chesapeake issued a press release, which
stated the inquiry “did not reveal any improper benefit to Mr. McClendon or increased cost
to [Chesapeake] as a result of the overlap in the financial relationships.” Chesapeake Energy
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Exhibit 99.1 (Feb. 20, 2013). Moreover, “[b]ased on the
documents reviewed and interviews conducted, no intentional misconduct by Mr.
McClendon or any of the company’s management was found by the Board concerning
th[o]se relationships and/or th[o]se transactions and issues.” Id. The board’s nuanced
findings invite speculation that McClendon did benefit, albeit not improperly, and that he did
engage in misconduct, albeit not intentionally. The board’s findings hardly constitute ringing
endorsements of the transactions.
343. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2, Exhibit 1.2 (May 2, 2012)
(setting forth letter agreement to terminate the FWPP as of June 30, 2014, or 18 months
early).
344. See infra Appendix A.
345. Daniel Gilbert, Icahn Ally Is Joining Board of Chesapeake, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303836404577475063484621778 [hereinafter
Gilbert, Icahn Ally]. Such resistance was reflected by Chesapeake’s lobbying efforts in favor of
the 2010 Amendment that mandated staggered boards. See supra Part I.
346. See supra Part I.C.1.
347. Ryan Dezember & Daniel Gilbert, Icahn Takes Chesapeake Energy Stake, WALL
ST. J., May 25, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023048409045774266
22973904532.
348. Id.
349. See infra note 352 (discussing the results of the 2012 annual meeting of
shareholders); see also Venkiteshwaran et al., supra note 42 (“[Icahn’s] acquired targets
posted a positive abnormal return of almost 25% from the time of Icahn’s disclosure of his
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Management (SEAM), which was Chesapeake’s largest shareholder, at
just under 14%. 350 In June 2012, succumbing to pressure from
shareholders, Chesapeake agreed to reconstitute its nine-member board,
with a majority of the board selected or endorsed by Icahn and
SEAM. 351
Moreover, in resolving disputes with those shareholders, the company
announced, just days prior to its 2012 annual meeting of shareholders, 352
that the board would “seek relief from the Oklahoma statute mandating
classified boards of directors . . . so that shareholders will have the

investment to the sale of the company. In sharp contrast, the returns to the surviving firm
subsample were a surprisingly negative 60%.”).
350. Clifford Krauss, Chesapeake Agrees to Revamp Its Board, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/05/business/chesapeake-agrees-to-new-board.html?pagewan
ted=all (noting SEAM owns 13.6% of Chesapeake stock); see also Gilbert, supra note 171.
351. Gilbert, Lublin & Gold, supra note 295. The original concern of the Oklahoma
Legislature—that Chesapeake could be acquired in a manner detrimental to the state, and
that prompted the 2010 Amendment—was at risk of being realized. Icahn and SEAM
advocated that Chesapeake consider selling itself. Gilbert, supra note 171.
352. At Chesapeake’s 2012 annual meeting of shareholders, at which only two directors
were up for election (due to Chesapeake’s staggered board), shareholders displayed their
disapproval of the incumbent nominees: V. Burns Hargis, president of Oklahoma State
University, commanded support from only 26% of the votes cast, and Richard Davidson,
former chief executive of Union Pacific Corp., received support from only 27% of those
votes. See Gilbert, Icahn Ally, supra note 345; Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report
(Form 8-K) 2 (June 8, 2012). Those levels were the lowest received by any director nominee
of any S&P500 company for the prior five years. See Russell Gold & Daniel Gilbert,
Chesapeake Directors Rejected by Shareholders, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2012, http://online.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303753904577454132886187926.
Despite
such
anemic support, each of the incumbents was reelected because directors are elected by
plurality under Oklahoma’s corporate code and Chesapeake’s bylaws. Chesapeake Energy
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 (June 8, 2012); 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1061(3) (2011). At
the same meeting, although the shareholders’ vote failed to meet the high threshold of twothirds of the outstanding shares for approval to amend the bylaws, the board—on its own—
amended the bylaw, to deviate from the default rule of plurality approval to elect any
director, and going-forward director nominees will be required to receive approval by a
majority of votes cast to be elected. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2
(June 8, 2012). “Shareholders also delivered a strong reprimand to the way Chesapeake pays
its top executives. The company’s pay practices were opposed by 80% in a nonbinding vote,
a reflection of discontent with the company’s pay to and supervision of Aubrey
McClendon . . . .” Gold & Gilbert, supra; see also Gilbert & Lublin, supra note 171 (noting
that, during 2012, Chesapeake was one of only a few corporations to have lost a non-binding
advisory vote by shareholders on executive compensation).
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opportunity to elect the entire board of directors at the 2013 Annual
Meeting of Shareholders.” 353
Further changes to the board, 354 and the passage of several months,
did nothing to change the board’s sentiment. As the 2013 legislative
session approached, Chesapeake’s board reiterated its commitment to
“seek relief from the Oklahoma statute mandating classified boards of
directors . . . .” 355 Moreover, Chesapeake’s board, broadly speaking,
threatened the Oklahoma Legislature: “In the event the Oklahoma
Legislature declines to grant relief from the classified board statute, the
Board intends to take the steps necessary to allow the Company to reincorporate in Delaware.” 356 That threat did not go unnoticed: “Carl
Icahn and the rest of the gang say they are going to take Chesapeake’s
corporation to Delaware if we don’t [adopt the pending bill].” 357
Moreover, Chesapeake lobbied the legislature to enact an effective
repeal of the 2010 Amendment. 358
B. The Legislative Process of the 2013 Amendment
On the first day of the legislative session, representatives introduced
the bill to “undo” the 2010 and 2012 Amendments in the House. 359
While Chesapeake effectively drafted its language, Representative
Jordan nominally authored the bill. 360 Within days, a House Committee
unanimously approved the bill; approximately one week after its
introduction, the House approved the bill by the vote of seventy to
353. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Exhibit 99.1 (June 6, 2012).
354. See infra Appendix A.
355. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Jan. 7, 2013).
356. Id. at 3.
357. 2013 House Debate, supra note 1 (quoting Rep. Cory Williams (D-Stillwater) at
59:09).
358. See Daniel Gilbert, Chesapeake Gets Reversal of Oklahoma Staggered-Terms Law,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732363960457
8370730747650130; Joe Wertz, First Bill Signed into Law in 2013 Undoes a Law Chesapeake
Energy Helped Write, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 6, 2013), http://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/
2013/03/06/first-bill-signed-into-law-in-2013-undoes-a-law-chesapeake-energy-helped-write/
(“Chesapeake Energy has been pushing for a new law to undo a previous law the company
helped write.”).
359. H.R. 1646, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2013); Bill Information for HB 1646, OKLA.
ST. LEGISLATURE, http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=HB1646&Session=1300
(follow “History” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 2, 2014) (reflecting introduction and first
reading on February 4, 2013).
360. Bill Information for HB 1646, supra note 359. Representative Jordan also authored
the 2012 Amendment. See Bill Information for HB 2658 (2011-2012), supra note 234.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

284

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:221

twenty-four, with seven members excused. 361 Within two weeks, and
after a committee thereof unanimously supported the bill, the Senate
passed the bill without opposition. 362 A month after its introduction, the
governor signed the bill, which was the first bill she signed in 2013. 363
C. Criticisms of the 2013 Amendment
Although the 2010 and 2012 Amendments merit criticism, the
restoration of ex-ante status quo was the proper move from a corporate
law perspective. But although it was the right thing to do, the bill
amounted to special-interest legislation yet again, as the legislature
enacted a statute effectively drafted by—and essentially benefitting—a
single corporation.
During the debate on the bill in the House, the legislators criticized
themselves:
[A]nd so now that [it’s 2013 and Chesapeake] is governed in a
different manner, it looks like we’re undoing the sweetheart
deal. That probably doesn’t give a very good perception to
the public. 364
[W]hen we’ve monkeyed with this twice by passing more
laws, we’ve actually made things worse on companies in
Oklahoma. 365
[W]hen it benefitted a few in [2010], we were asked to come
in and run special legislation that ran contrary to free market
principles . . . . We . . . restrict[ed] how corporations [could]
do things for basically protectionist purposes, and we all
supported [the bill in 2010] because we all care about those
companies. But now . . . we’re going to turn around and say,
“Well, we’re going to ignore those protectionist principles we

361. Bill Information for HB 1646, supra note 359 (follow “Votes” hyperlink; then
follow “HB1646_VOTES.HTM All House Votes” hyperlink) (reflecting vote in the House).
362. Id. (follow “Votes” hyperlink; then follow “HB1646_VOTES.HTM All Senate
Votes” hyperlink) (reflecting vote of 44-0, with 4 excused).
363. Id. (follow “History” hyperlink) (showing first reading on Feb. 4, 2013, and
approval by the governor on Mar. 5, 2013); Wertz, supra note 358.
364. 2013 House Debate, supra note 1 (quoting Rep. Mike Reynolds (R-Oklahoma City)
at 22:48).
365. Id. (quoting Rep. Joe Dorman (D-Rush Springs) at 37:13).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss2/1

2015]

OKLAHOMA’S CORPORATE LAW AMENDMENTS

285

set up a couple of years ago, and open it back up to basic free
market principles again.” 366
This is the third time [that we have amended this statute]. . . .
If we’re doing it for the shareholders [of Chesapeake] this
time, does that mean I was duped into doing it for the CEO
[of Chesapeake] the first time . . . ? 367
Though the overall process demands criticism, the legislature’s action in
2013 shored up some of the deficiencies of the process accompanying
the 2010 and 2012 Amendments.
For example, the legislature consulted the OK Bar Committee about
the 2013 proposal, the Committee expressed approval, and the proposal
moved forward with the Committee’s support. The Committee did not
draft the amendment, however, as it historically has done since its
creation. 368
Although Chesapeake moved forward in 2010 without the knowledge
or support of other significant Oklahoma corporations—namely ONEOK
and OGE—in 2013, Chesapeake solicited and received the support of
those companies. 369
Conclusion
After much to do, the Oklahoma legislature restored the appropriate
language in the staggered-board statutory provision, which, once again,
sets the default consistent with the prevailing choice of managers and
investors, while allowing those parties to deviate from the norm. If the
legislature had consulted the OK Bar Committee, then the committee
would have counseled against the 2010 Amendment. If the legislature
had persisted, then the OK Bar Committee would have crafted a
legislative compromise that would have negated the need for the 2012
Amendment. By following the standard operating procedure for
implementing updates to the Oklahoma corporate code—utilization of
the OK Bar Committee—the legislature involves those with the most
pertinent expertise. Moreover, the members of the committee generally
366. Id. (quoting Rep. Scott Inman (D-Oklahoma City) at 39:21).
367. Id. (quoting Rep. Cory Williams (D-Stillwater) at 57:19).
368. See supra notes 98-104.
369. Neither ONEOK nor OGE lobbied the legislature for the 2013 Amendment because
their concerns had been addressed in 2012, and because Chesapeake’s proposal (restoration
of the ex ante status quo) would permit them to have their preferred de-staggered boards. See
supra Part II.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

286

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:221

represent different constituencies—litigators and transactional attorneys,
in-house attorneys and outside counsel, defense attorneys and plaintiffs’
attorneys. By representing such varied interests, the members of the OK
Bar Committee are more likely to craft well-grounded and well-rounded
legislation. Granted, attorneys may be impacted by the legislation that
they craft, and may be motivated by self-interest, 370 but, unless
legislators themselves possess the appropriate business law expertise
and are willing to wield the drafting pen, the OK Bar Committee should
initially draft updates to the Oklahoma corporate code. Thereafter, the
legislation crafted by the OK Bar Committee can be circulated to other
constituencies for commentary, 371 to eliminate, or at least weaken, any
self-interested efforts.

370. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 473 (1987) (“[W]e conclude that Delaware
law reflects a political equilibrium among the various interest groups within the state in
which the lawyers enjoy a dominant position.”).
371. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
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APPENDIX A
Chesapeake’s Board Composition,
Pre-Shareholder Action of 2012 372
Aubrey McClendon,
Chairman & CEO374

Chesapeake’s Board Composition,
Post-Shareholder Action of 2012 373
Archie W. Dunham,
Chairman

Richard K. Davidson375

R. Douglas Lawler, CEO376

Kathleen M. Eisenbrenner 377

Vincent J. Intrieri378

V. Burns Hargis379

Louis A. Raspino 380

Frank Keating381

Bob G. Alexander382

Charles T. Maxwell383

R. Brad Martin384

Don Nickles385

Frederic M. Poses 386

Louis A. Simpson387

Thomas L. Ryan 388

Merrill A. Miller, Jr.

Merrill A. Miller, Jr.

test 374
372. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 1, 7-9 (May 11, 2012)
(noticing shareholders of the upcoming annual meeting and identifying members of the
board).
373. By mid-2013, Chesapeake has replaced all but one of its directors with individuals
recommended or approved by its largest shareholders. Gilbert, Chesapeake CEO, supra note
342.
374. McClendon was removed as Chairman in May 2012. Gold, Board Crimps CEO’s
Power, supra note 260. By agreement with the Board, McClendon stepped down as CEO on
April 1, 2013. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 19, 2013).
375. Despite receiving only 27% of the vote at the 2012 annual meeting of shareholders,
Davidson was reelected to the board under Chesapeake’s extant bylaws. Chesapeake Energy
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 8, 2012). Davidson, Eisenbrenner, Keating, and
Nickles resigned in June 2012. Press Release, Chesapeake Energy Corporation Announces
Reconstituted Board, June 21, 2012 [hereinafter Chesapeake Announces Reconstituted
Board].
376. Effective June 17, 2013, Lawler joined Chesapeake as CEO and a member of the
board. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 20, 2013).
377. Eisenbrenner resigned on June 8, 2012. Press Release, Chesapeake Announces
Reconstituted Board, supra note 375.
378. Intrieri was proposed by Carl Icahn, who, at the time, was Chesapeake’s second
largest shareholder. Id.
379. Hargis received only 26% of the vote at the 2012 shareholder meeting, which was
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the lowest amount for a nominee of an S&P 500 company over the prior five years. See Gold
& Gilbert, supra note 352. Hargis was elected to the board under Chesapeake’s extant
bylaws. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 (June 8, 2012). Hargis
tendered his resignation; however, as chairman of the Audit Committee, Hargis was
retained, pending completion of the ongoing inquiry regarding the suspicious transactions
involving McClendon. Press Release, Chesapeake Announces Reconstituted Board, supra
note 375. On March 7, 2013, following completion of the inquiry, which found no
intentional misconduct by McClendon, Hargis resigned. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current
Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Mar. 7, 2013). Despite some suggestion that Hargis was not
independent because Chesapeake donated two million dollars to Oklahoma State University,
where Hargis served as president, see Gilbert, supra note 262, Chesapeake’s largest
shareholder, which had advocated for a shakeup of the board’s composition, favored
retaining Hargis until the inquiry was complete. Id.
380. The board appointed Raspino to replace Hargis. Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current
Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Mar. 7, 2013). See generally 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1068(a)(1) (2011)
(empowering the board to fill board vacancies).
381. Keating resigned on June 8, 2012. Press Release, Chesapeake Announces
Reconstituted Board, supra note 375.
382. Alexander was proposed by Chesapeake’s largest shareholder. Id.
383. Maxwell retired on June 8, 2012, the date of the shareholder meeting. Id.
384. Martin was proposed by Chesapeake’s largest shareholder. Id.
385. Nickles resigned on June 8, 2012. Id.
386. Poses was proposed by Chesapeake’s largest shareholder. Id.
387. In 2011, Simpson joined the board at the request of Chesapeake’s largest
shareholder. Id. However, Simpson resigned on May 3, 2013. Chesapeake Energy Corp.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 (May 3, 2013).
388. “Ryan was recommended by [Chesapeake’s] largest shareholder, Southeastern Asset
Management, Inc.” Chesapeake Energy Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 (May 3, 2013).
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